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E. E. Stein  
July, 1906.







THE SPLIT BETWEEN THE  
RALLIEMENT DES CREDITISTES AND THE  
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AN ATTITUDINAL EXPLANATION

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THE SPLIT BETWEEN THE RALLIEMENT DES CREDITISTES

AND THE NATIONAL SOCIAL CREDIT PARTY:

AN ATTITUDINAL EXPLANATION

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CHAPTER IV: ANALYSIS OF THE FACTORS INVOLVED IN THE SPLIT:  
AN ATTITUDINAL EXPLANATION.

A) A CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE FACTORS OTHER THAN ATTITUDES

Journalists and commentators have listed a number of possible causes of the split: circumstantial events, competing ambitions, differences in personality, ideology, or orientations to political action. Most of these have been deduced from their own observation of events, generally from a one-sided and partial perspective. At times the explanations which some of the participants in the split have offered as to why it occurred have been quoted as definitive. This is poor analysis. Obviously a Dr. Marcoux cannot hold the same opinion about the role of personality conflict or personal ambitions as does Réal Caouette. And Robert Thompson is hardly likely to see the role of French-English relations in the same way as Gilles Grégoire.

The most elementary step has not thus far been taken: to interview a reasonable cross-section of the major participants in the split. It is essential to have a broad perspective encompassing all major conflicting viewpoints. One can then analyze the inter-relationship of the various factors at play with greater objectivity. In the analysis which follows, this task has been undertaken.





Certain preliminary judgments emerge immediately from our interviews. First, most of those interviewed have argued that circumstantial events were at most a precipitator of the split. The overthrow of the Diefenbaker Government, the affair of the six, the attempt on the part of the national Social Credit Council to drop the post of deputy leader -- all of these events were merely instances in what was to most an ever-deepening breach between the two men. As one of the deputies put it: "if it hadn't happened in 1963, it would have occurred in 1964 or 1965" (T). It was a matter of time before these two obviously incompatible men would part ways. The events might have been circumstantial in their timing and sequence, but they were hardly so in their relation to the split.

Secondly, the competing ambitions of such men as Caouette, Legault, Marcoux, Thompson, Perron and Rondeau, and Gilles Grégoire were recognized and in some instances became important psychological factors in bringing about the split. But such competing ambitions are normal in any political party or movement, and generally can be moderated by other considerations: common overriding interests of party, financial benefits which are shared by all, recognized norms of party behaviour, place and position. In the case of the Social Credit Party, these moderating influences were unable to play their normal role. The centrifugal pull of other forces was too great.



Like competing ambitions, personality conflict is an almost inevitable factor in any party. Generally it is also underplayed in the pursuit of common ends. However, when personality differences exist at the leadership level, they can sometimes split the party asunder. In the case of Caouette and Thompson, differences did exist and were obvious and apparent to all. Thompson is a relatively quiet-spoken, restrained, colourless man, with a certain air of efficiency about him; Réal Caouette is volatile, impulsive, outspoken, and flamboyant, not overly careful about what he says, whom he affects, and what he neglects. Both, however, are congenial, earnest men, who give the appearance of meaning what they say and of pursuing what they profess. In their perceptions of each other, neither was exceptionally critical of the other. Of Caouette, Thompson said: "I don't think he is a bad man. I think he is a foolish man and he doesn't think and is easily led. People put words in his mouth". And Caouette's only complaint against Thompson was: "He is not a leader and never will be a leader in his life". Moreover, these opinions of the personalities of the two men were shared by most of the other participants coming from either of the two camps. Thompson is "a gentleman, a nice man, a good man, according to one critic, (B) ... the only point is that he is not a leader". An admirer among his Quebec delegates remarked (T), "He had a much larger vision than Caouette". Another saw Thompson





as a "thoroughly honest man, sincere, fully involved in Social Credit". Perhaps the most objective evaluation came from a former representative of the Ralliement on the national executive who is not identified today with either camp (W):

"I have much admiration for Thompson. Thompson is a sincere man, I think he is sincere in spite of what Caouette, in spite of what others say about him. But he lacks certain qualities of a leader. He is a thinker, a bit of a dreamer perhaps, but I think he is a sincere man".

The opinion of Caouette was not always so generous.

"I have the profound impression that Caouette is a faker who has never believed in Social Credit; he is a political animal, not an animal even for directing politics, but one for conducting election campaigns. He is a talking machine, a person who plays to have the crowd in his hand. He always succeeds in captivating his audience. That's Caouette 100%". This came, however, from "S" who as a competitor for party leadership nourished some obvious jealousies. Other Thompson-nites simply attributed Caouette's personal abrasiveness to his irresponsibility and lack of seriousness. It was Caouette's "political personality" which irritated "U". "Caouette is in spite of everything a sincere man, even if he says nonsensical things". This same "political personality" seems to have irritated a number of Caouette's own supporters. Caouette is governed by personal pride and personal ideas, failing to submit





them to the group for discussion. He is an impulsive man, who talks on the basis of impressions rather than knowledge, and won't readily take advice." (W). "Caouette inherited some of Gilberte Coté's qualities. He is too dictatorial". (I). "Caouette is too brusque, and doesn't think enough." (L). The most generous description of Caouette was provided by one of his former M.P.'s who said, admiringly, "Even if he has personal faults, Caouette endured much ... Caouette, there's a man. When he says something today, tomorrow, it's still so ... That man, he has a powerful fist. When there's a difference of opinion in caucus, Caouette arrives and then tounge, tounge, everybody is clearly demolished ... He has ideas. He's a just man." (E).

One has the impression from these descriptions that personality conflict could easily have been avoided, had other factors not come into play. Robert Thompson was a mild man, who was anxious to please, and easy to appease. Caouette was, it is true, rather impatient, and disinclined to play the role of second-in command. In private life he was congenial, friendly, even warm. As a public personality he was sensitive to party needs. And he could follow as well as lead. He had followed Gilberte Coté for 15 years. Personality differences were aggravated by other factors which were quite independent of them -- situational and cultural differences.



Ideological differences were cited by Mr. Caouette as an important reason for the split. He accused Robert Thompson of abandoning Social Credit doctrine, of rejecting a central part of Major Douglas' programme, the national dividend. He complained that Thompson, like his mentor, Premier Manning of Alberta, had yielded to pragmatic interests and decided that Social Credit doctrine could never be implemented, even at the national level. The aim of the Manning administration -- efficient and conservative government, rather than Social Credit policy -- was now being embraced by the Social Credit federal members from the west.<sup>1</sup>

Most of the Social Credit members, east and west, who were familiar with the arguments and the doctrine itself were skeptical about the role which such ideological factors might have played in the split. Most of them perceived Caouette and Thompson as seeking the same ends: a social credit monetary system in operation at the national level. The means to that end were approximately the same: elect a government capable of passing social credit legislation, or elect a Social Credit group in Parliament large enough to exert pressures on or form a coalition with the largest minority group -- and thus induce them to make concessions to Social Credit doctrine. If

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<sup>1</sup> Interview, April, 1964.





Thompson at times seemed to modify his demand for the implementation of social credit, it was because he recognized that the doctrine espoused by Major Douglas was subject to modernization and updating in terms of recent economic experiments and governmental programmes.

It is probable that Caouette himself was aware of these attitudes, and even supported them in principle in his more thoughtful and restrained moments. But he was also inclined to doctrinal orthodoxy or what he called "Social Credit theory applied without conditions". This led him to oppose a number of orthodox economic measures introduced by different governments: austerity, pension legislation financed out of taxes, nationalization of hydro-electricity. The statements which he made in these matters sprung from his "orthodox orientation", and contradicted some of the more pragmatic attitudes of other Social Credit parliamentarians. The press often quoted these contradictory statements in order to cast aspersions on the supposed unity of the social credit team. This in turn irritated Caouette and certain of his followers who regarded themselves as 100% Douglasites. When the conditions allowing for continued union became intolerable, Caouette cited the doctrinal differences as a means of gaining the support of his Cr ditiste colleagues. In a number of instances he managed thus to win over the wavering members





to his side. Ideological cleavage then, was not so much a cause of the split, as it was a means of rationalizing it, and of acting as catalyst for it.

## B) ORIENTATIONAL DIFFERENCES

The factor which remains -- orientational differences -- is the one which has generally been most underplayed in analyses. In part this is due to the complexities and shortcomings of this concept. It is not one which can easily be defined or made susceptible to analysis. It is a broad concept -- one which embraces a whole spectrum of beliefs, attitudes, postures towards a whole range of subject matter. As an explanatory tool it suffers from a number of obvious weaknesses. First it is unusual for orientations to provoke action in and of themselves. Orientations are normally passive components in any action. They need to be stimulated in order to provoke response. In this sense they are not so much causes as accessories to the cause. Secondly, specific factors must be identified as specific causes in specific actions, and this is almost impossible to do in the case of orientations. Actions generally arise from a series of related and interdependent sets of orientations, no one of which can be clearly isolated as the dominant orientation in the action. Thus even if one accepts the proposition that orientations in some sense "cause" actions, one cannot readily find which set of orientations



is the cause which one wishes to identify.

Nevertheless, orientations have recently become a subject of careful re-evaluation in social science studies.<sup>1</sup> For one thing, they are now recognized as autonomous variables in social equations. They have a life and substance all of their own. Formerly it was thought that all orientations were mere reflections of the social forces which they capsule. Thus an anti-French-Canadian attitude was seen as the result of historical and social confrontations with French Canadians. The same confrontations were considered to have provoked the anti-French-Canadian actions towards French Canadians rather than the deep-rooted, subjective orientations. It became necessary in this way to identify remote and distant forces as causes of action, where often orientations were more directly involved.

In the attempt to identify causes of so-called "political actions" the concept of "orientations" now looms large. Actions which are "political" are those which relate in some way to the making of authoritative decisions for a society.<sup>2</sup> It is hypothesized that most "political actions" derive in large part from orientations which are in large part "political"

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<sup>1</sup> For example, see the adaptation of Talcott Parson's work in this field to such recent political writings as G. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton U. Press, 1962) and S. Verba and L. Pye Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton U. Press, 1965).

<sup>2</sup> David Easton, The Political System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1953).





themselves. "Political orientations" are those which focus on the purely "political" in society: the political system its parts, the relation of the individual to the authoritative decision-makers in a society, the relation of the decisions to the individual. The assumption is that an action which is directed towards some "political" object or end does not readily arise from orientations which are neither directly nor indirectly related to "politics".<sup>1</sup>

The split between the two wings of the Social Credit Party was a "political" action taken by "political actors" who were grouped together largely if not entirely for "political" ends. The factors which led to the original union between these two groups of actors were likewise "political". The assumption which we shall make to begin with, then is that these actions were not unique, but part of a whole series of patterned actions taken by these Social Credit actors in the pursuit of their political goals. Likewise it is assumed that the element of "repetitiveness" and of "similarity" associated with the word "pattern" can be accounted for in terms of definable sets of beliefs, attitudes, and postures to actions<sup>2</sup> which are likewise

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<sup>1</sup> For example, it might be hypothesized that joining the Social Credit Party would be more likely to arise from certain beliefs about political parties than from a desire to please one's parents. Further research is needed to support this contention.

<sup>2</sup> That is, an "orientation". An "orientation" is defined then, as a definable and coherent set of beliefs, attitudes, and postures to action.



"patterned" and shared by actors. In other words, the actions are "patterned" because they derive from orientations which themselves are "patterned". And there is a tendency among groups of closely-associated people to show similar patterns of behaviour, which also derive from similar patterns of orientation. This is true both because people with similar orientation patterns are drawn together in associations and because in associating, people tend to acquire similar orientations. But the assumption is made that the former is the more dominant relationship in the two-way process.

The two wings of Social Credit which split in 1963 were, each of them, groups of closely-associated people who shared similar patterns of political behaviour derived from similar patterns of political orientation. The members of these two groups shared a limited number of beliefs, attitudes, and postures which were common to both groups. In particular, the common allegiance to social credit both as an ideal and as a system possible of attainment bound the two groups together. In addition, there was a common allegiance to one means for obtaining social credit, the "political" one of electing Social Credit members to the national Parliament in order to form a government which would be able to pass social credit legislation. It was this latter belief which was most responsible for the union between the two wings, first in 1944, and then in 1960. Apart from these two major bonds, however, there was very little in the way of orientations which united the two groups.





Among the common orientations were: they were all Canadians, participating in and reasonably familiar with the working of the same national political system. They were all more or less interested in politics not only for its possibilities of satisfying their ultimate political ideals and aspirations, viz. economic prosperity and well-being for all Canadians, but also for its more immediate political gratifications, namely the rewards of political office, the satisfaction of appetites for political involvement and activity, the desire for status and prestige. Finally, there were originally some common social bonds which, however, in recent years were growing weaker.<sup>1</sup>

The differences in orientation between the two groups far outweighed their similarities. We have learned already that they were centered in two very distant parts of the country, Alberta and Quebec. These two provinces are obviously different in history, economic organization, social, religious, ethnic and linguistic composition, and cultural outlook. We have also examined the behaviour patterns of the two wings, pointing out in summary fashion some of the major areas of friction and direct conflict between them. It is possible to induce certain of the attitudinal patterns shared by the members of these groups from this study of their behaviour. But

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<sup>1</sup> The Social Credit members from both Alberta and Quebec were originally socially and economically among the "have not" groups in their respective milieus. In recent years the Alberta wing has been more and identified with people of higher status and income.



obviously this kind of analysis is insufficient. A more direct and more fruitful approach is to examine systematically the attitudes, beliefs and orientations of the members from their own statements and responses.

### C) METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

#### The Political Culture of French and English Canada in relation to Social Credit Ideology.

Verba defines the relationship between political culture and political ideologies and political systems as follows: the political culture of a society affects the system of ideology and the system of political interaction by providing a system of control within which these first two systems operate.<sup>1</sup> The case of Social Credit is a classic example of this.

We assume that there is no need to define explicitly here the concepts "political culture", "political system" and "political ideology", since all three were treated in detail in Chapter II. French and English Canada share and operate within the same national political system of Canada. The 4 major parties which operate within the one environment also operate within the other. Just as there is one common political system for all Canadians, there is also one system of ideology for all Social Crediters who accept the doctrine of Major Douglas as in

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<sup>1</sup> S. Verba and L. Pye, Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, 1965) final essay by Verba, p. 517.





some sense the embodiment of their unarticulated social, economic and political beliefs and attitudes.

This commonality breaks down in treating the "political culture" of Canadians. Verba has distinguished between the concepts "political culture" and "political sub-culture". He uses Rokeach's notion of "primitive beliefs" to define the latter concept. Primitive political beliefs are "those beliefs which are so implicit and generally taken for granted that the individual believes that all other members of that society hold them: they are the unstated assumptions and postulates about politics".<sup>1</sup>

According to Verba, a political "sub-culture" exists when there is a sub-group of society whose fundamental assumptions about politics (i.e. primitive political beliefs) differ from the assumptions predominant in that society.<sup>2</sup> It is our hypothesis that the French-Canadian political culture is such a sub-culture within the larger Canadian (dominantly Anglo-Saxon and Protestant) political culture. By definition this is true, provided one agrees that the primitive political beliefs of French-Canadian society are significantly different from those of English Canada. There should be little hesitation on this point. The writings of such astute observers as

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 518.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 519.



Michael Oliver and Pierre-Elliott Trudeau attest to this difference in primitive political beliefs.<sup>1</sup>

Now assuming that this hypothesis is accepted, it follows that the separate political sub-culture of French Canada acts as a control system within which the ideology of Social Credit and the political system of Canada operate. In other words, it is the political culture of French-Canada which so affects the operation of the Social Credit party within the province of Quebec as to make the behaviour of its members significantly different from that of Social Credit members in all English-speaking provinces. And this factor, above all others, accounts for the split between the Quebec wing and the national Social Credit Association on two separate occasions.

Verba is careful to point out that "political culture" if too generally defined, cannot serve as an explanatory tool. One must specify what aspects of political culture, i.e. what beliefs about what objects, are important elements for explaining the operation of political systems. At the same time one must avoid being too specific; that is, one must not isolate attitudes which deal with such concrete political desiderata as party affiliation, concrete policies of one sort or another, etc. In other words, these isolated aspects of

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<sup>1</sup> See M. Oliver. The Social and Political Ideas of French-Canadian Nationalists 1920-1945. Unpublished PhD. thesis McGill University, 1956; and P.E. Trudeau (ed). La Grève de l'Amiante, (les éditions Cité Libre, Montréal, 1956) Introduction.





political culture must be "of a general sort".<sup>1</sup>

The general political beliefs which Verba has in mind are "usually mixtures of political cognitions, (i.e. information about politics) and standards of evaluation". These include, beliefs about the ends of political activity, the nature of the political process, and the place of the individual in the process. They must define aspects which are relevant to all segments of the society (cross-national) and which most people have orientations about.<sup>2</sup>

Verba lists four dimensions which are supposed to direct the researcher to the kinds of beliefs he has in mind. They are: beliefs related to 1) national identity, 2) identification with one's fellow-citizens, 3) governmental output and 4) the process of decision-making.

Beliefs related to national identity define the individual's relation to the nation-state and the society of which he is a member. The individual's definition of himself as a member of some national or sub-national grouping is often the key to this orientation. In Canada, one might identify

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<sup>1</sup> Verba & Pye, op. cit., p. 527. See also below, pp. 129-130. The point here is of fundamental importance to comparative politics; namely that explanatory statements and variables must neither be so specific (e.g. public opinion data) as to prevent comparisons nor so general as to be mere truisms.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 527.



oneself as a Canadian, an English Canadian, a French Canadian, a "new" Canadian, a Quebecker, a Montrealer, a Torontonion, an Albertan, a westerner, a Maritimer, and so forth. At the same time, one defines the relation of other national or sub-national groupings to oneself. Thus a French Canadian might describe an English-speaking Canadian as a "fellow Canadian", an English Canadian, an English-speaking Canadian, an Anglo-Saxon, a "wasp", a westerner, and so forth. French Canadians are likewise seen by English-speaking Canadians as Quebeckers French Canadians, Catholics, French Catholics, Frenchmen, and so forth.

Beliefs involving identification with one's fellow-citizens describe the relationship of the individual to the other members of his own national or sub-national grouping. One good means of isolating this pattern of orientation is to try to discover the way in which the individual refers to these other members. For example, do French Canadians see themselves as a homogeneous national grouping, or do they perceive differences of class, status, rural-urban divisions, gaps in wealth, education, and regional discrepancies among the members of their own sub-national grouping? Do they distinguish between French-speaking Protestants and Catholics? Do English-speaking Protestants from the Prairies perceive themselves as markedly different from English-speaking Protestants from Ontario, Quebec or the Maritimes? Do English-





speaking Protestants distinguish themselves from Catholics? Do those who originate from the British Isles consider themselves as different from those who came from countries in continental west or eastern Europe?

Beliefs about governmental output delineate the relationship of the individual to the authoritative decisions which are made for all members of his society. One can ask the individual whether he feels that the political system is meeting his own expectations of what government should do or not do for every citizen, whether he feels that the economic measures being taken by alternating parties forming the government are sufficient for meeting individual crises and deprivations, whether social legislation is adequate for his needs, whether the outcomes are depriving him of certain other material or spiritual values, how he thinks governmental outputs are being distributed among the members of society, what groups or classes, in his opinion, are benefitting most, and which least, whether certain kinds of outputs are given preference over others, etc. For example, one might ask: is the system of government in Canada adequately meeting the needs of all Canadians? Or is the present system producing very little in the way of important outputs? What are the different kinds of outputs that recent governments in Canada have provided for Canadians? Are they largely economic?



social? cultural? Do they significantly affect the way of life of Canadians? What benefits were derived from these policies? Did they affect our material position? our freedom? our social mores? Who gained most by these policies, businessmen? labourers? farmers? professionals? urban or rural groups? Ontarians or Westerners? French or English Canadians?

Beliefs concerning the process of decision-making delineate the individual's relation to the overall process and to each of its major parts: in the case of Canada, parties, pressure groups, M.P.'s, cabinet ministers, public administrators, judges. It is a two-way relationship, which encompasses both the individual's perception of these processes and his own sense of efficacy in affecting or influencing any or all of them. To get at such beliefs, one might ask the individual Canadian how well he feels the process of decision-making operates, what kind of changes might be made in it, and why, how adequate he considers the operating system of parties to be in relation to the overall system and its desired ends, what is his view of the pressure groups operating within the system, how effective he regards recent cabinets to have been, how he views the public services in Ottawa in terms of efficiency, accessibility, justice, etc. In addition, he might be asked whether he thinks it is beneficial to belong to a political party, which party or parties he feels are most easily





penetrated for rewards of prestige, patronage jobs, etc., which channel is most readily accessible for influencing government, how he relates to his M.P., whether he regards the courts as an easy means for obtaining redress of his wrongs, and if so, which court or courts, etc.

All of these dimensions are, of course, inter-related in some way. In fact, it is this interdependence which most clearly defines differences in political cultures and sub-cultures. Precisely because beliefs, attitudes and pre-dispositions are so interdependent, they generally form a close interwoven whole, bound together by logical relations and corollaries, which serve to demarcate that individual and set him apart from his fellow-citizens. At the same time, this interdependence enables the observer to classify the individual's beliefs as one of a limited number of "types" or "sets of patterns".

Finally, we must clarify the origin of patterns of orientations. Political cultures are said to be learned by the members of a grouping or sub-grouping in their past experiences in both non-political and political life. Canadians of all languages, religions, and regions may be said to "learn" their political culture in their own direct experiences as actors in the political process. Such experiences are heightened by important political events or crises which stamp themselves on the minds and memories of the individuals



involved. For example, in Canada, a crisis like the depression has left an irrevocable mark on westerners who lived and almost starved through the times. It has intensified their own feelings of solidarity as westerners; it has sharpened their feelings of provincialism vis-à-vis the rest of Canada; it has shaped their expectations and demands as to their share in the governmental output pie, especially in relation to agriculture; it has determined their attitudes towards the national decision-making process, in particular their critical image of the two old-line parties, their skeptical attitude towards their federal M.P.'s, their perception of the system as being dominated by "Bay Street financiers". Likewise, the conscription crisis of World War II affected most French Canadians adversely in their attitudes towards federal politics. Their consciousness of being French Canadians as distinct from other Canadians was heightened by the results of the conscription plebiscite, in which 80% of Canadians from the English-speaking provinces were in favour of the draft and 72% of Quebeckers (including both English-speaking and French-speaking groups) were opposed. Their feelings of solidarity with their fellow French-Canadians were enhanced by what appeared to be a show of unity by French-Canadians, particularly those from Quebec. Certain negative attitudes towards the old-line parties were generated as a result of the Conservatives and Liberals' stance on the issue.





Most French-Canadian Liberal M.P.'s alienated themselves from the voters by their failure to take a nationalist stand on the issue. Many French Canadians may also have felt that the federal government was directed towards the needs and demands of large-scale industry and urban manufacturing rather than towards the urban underprivileged and the consumer.

Such attitudes are not only shared by the people who directly experience them; they are transmitted to younger generations by means of socialization processes which exist in the family, in schools, in churches, in peer groups. An attitude may be transmitted by direct and overt means or by indirect and unconscious means. For example, French-Canadian children may be taught in the families and schools that conscription is bad, particularly for French Canadians. This is direct transmission. On the other hand, a French-Canadian father may decry the evils of American participation in Viet Nam as "unnecessary involvement in a foreign war". The other members of his family are thus influenced indirectly to oppose Canadian, and particularly French Canadian participation in foreign wars. This is unconscious or latent transmission.

Let us return then, to our major hypothesis, which is to show how the political culture (sub-culture) of French Canada affected the Social Credit split. We have already sketched the behavioural patterns of the two major groups



(Thompsonnites, Caouettistes). We can induce from this that such patterns are repetitive (a similar union and split occurred between substantially the same groups on two separate occasions, over 10 years apart). We can also assume that these repetitive behavioural patterns result from attitudinal patterns which are deeply-ingrained, strongly-held, and interdependent. This, at any rate, is what the descriptive account of the history of the two wings would seem to suggest.

However, it is clear that it is insufficient to induce such attitudes from a study of behavioural patterns alone. If it was the underlying orientations which produced the split, the attempt must be made to get at these orientations more directly. Here again the technique of the depth interview becomes invaluable.

One further caveat remains, of course, in this method of analysis. Asking the actors 1 year or 1½ years after the split what attitudes or beliefs, or what underlying orientations, caused them to act in the manner in which they did is not scientifically foolproof. Clearly their memories may be bad, their behaviours might have arisen from quite different orientations from those which they identify in the interview. That is why it is necessary to go beyond the questions directly related to the cause of the split and probe the whole syndrome of attitudes which these actors do or do not share with one other. Even this, of course, is not a perfect test.





The ideal method would be to probe the underlying orientations at the moment of the action. But that is an impossible methodological task.

The method we use, then, is the interview technique which probes directly at attitudes and orientations in order to establish their correspondence with the hypothesized orientations that one induces from a study of behaviour patterns. It is a check rather than a foolproof scientific method for establishing causation.

It must be admitted that even these interviews were not conducted according the strictest rules of scientific procedure. First, although virtually all of the major actors involved in the 1963 split were interviewed, (so that almost a total population was obtained), a rigidly-structured, closed-ended questionnaire was not used. Certain of the same questions were repeated from one interview to the next, but that is all. The reason was two-fold: 1) it was felt that a more rigidly-structured interview would have inhibited the interviewee to the point where he would not have answered the questions asked of him. A loosely-structured interview enabled the respondent to hold forth freely on one or another topic. Thus the respondent often related his underlying orientations to actual events by himself, without prompting from the interviewer. Secondly, the purpose of the interviews was not only to get at orientations, but also to elicit information related to the split which could not be obtained



from other sources. A less-structured interview was more desirable for this purpose. The second somewhat unscientific procedure was the use made of the tape-recorder. It is often thought that a tape-recorder inhibits the respondent, and thus biases the data. The experience of the interviewers somewhat belies this assumption. Generally those interviewed seemed quite unconscious of the presence of the tape-recorder, which lay inauspiciously at their side. Moreover, the value of recording everything that was said, of having an adequate record of the texture of the respondent's thought, his manner of expression, his accent, his processes of thought and his emotional reactions, far outweighed any drawbacks of interviewer bias. Finally, we carried out no statistical or scale analysis as is generally done in structured interviews. The reason for this is obvious. there was no need for it in this kind of unstructured situation.

One final methodological point: rather than including attitudes of western social crediters in the analysis, we have decided to use them as a kind of "control". In particular the attitudes of Robert Thompson, the Social Credit leader, have been set off in contrast to those of French Canadian Social Crediters. The reasons for this are two-fold: 1) the split was largely a result of unilateral action taken by the French-speaking group. The English-speaking Social Crediters responded in a rather docile fashion, and usually with extreme





sensitivity to the hazards of provoking the French-speaking group. Thus the attitudes which provoked the split were almost all on one side: it was French-Canadian perception of English-speaking attitudes, rather than these attitudes themselves which were a large contributing factor in the split.

2) A very small number of English-speaking Social Crediters, mainly those directly connected with the national Social Credit Association, were actually involved in the split. Most of them shared approximately the same view of Mr. Thompson; this is apparent from the replies of both followers of Thompson and of Caouette in Quebec. Finally, most of them were not readily available at the time when the interviews were conducted: they had gone back to their native provinces of Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia.

The major comparisons are drawn, then, between "old" (les vieux) and "new" (nouveaux) French-speaking Social Crediters (Créditistes). This is the distinction which all of those interviewed made themselves, and is one which is universally perceived as a major psychological variable in the split. "Old" Créditistes are those who had been either full-fledged members of the Ralliement precursor, the Union des Electeurs, or had subscribed to Vers Demain, the Union des Electeurs newspaper. A further means of identification, though one which is somewhat narrower and therefore misleading is that "old" Créditistes generally also wore the familiar



badge of the Union des Electeurs, the "white beret". They are therefore referred to as "berets blancs". Finally the distinction has been made particularly by the "new" Cr ditistes, between "Gilbertistes" and "modernistes". The former are those who marched under the banner of Mme Gilberte Cot -Mercier whom Caouette has referred to as "the one and sole boss of the Union des Electeurs". It is a derogatory term, meant to imply a narrow, sectarian outlook, and a tendency to show observance to dictatorial leadership, militaristic tactics, mysticism and even religious and doctrinal fanaticism. The "modernistes", on the other hand, stand for "modernizing" of the movements' image, tactics, leadership, and ideology. "Modernistes" are those who had never before belonged to the Union des Electeurs and who had joined the Ralliement only a year or two before the 1962 election.

#### D) CREDITISTE IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL CULTURE

The ideology and political culture of Cr ditistes of both types ("old" and "new") can be systematized in terms of Varba's categories of "primitive political beliefs" and his "four dimensions" of any political culture. Both of these have been defined previously. No attempt will be made here sharply to separate "ideology" from "political culture", although wherever possible, we shall try to distinguish between a belief articulated as an automatic ideological





response, and one which reflects a more deep-seated personal orientation.

The primitive political beliefs of the interview respondents were grouped into five main categories:

1. beliefs about the general nature of politics, 2. beliefs about the relationship between religion and politics, 3. beliefs about authority and leadership, 4. attitudes towards ideologies and belief systems in general, and, 5. beliefs about the value of democracy.

1. The nature of politics in general

All respondents showed a tendency in their perceptions to draw a sharp dichotomy between what politics is and what politics should be. First of all, politics itself as an activity was narrowly defined in terms of parties, elections and the application of pressures on government. It was thus distinguished from such infrastructural political activity as union participation and from more formalized structures like federal and municipal administration. Politics as it actually exists at present in most democracies and dictatorships is generally a bad game: in democracies, politics is largely the function of the "electoral fund", the "government contract", and the banking and taxation system. In dictatorships, politics is the destruction of the freedom of the individual. On the other hand, there was a certain admiration for this "game",



as seen in the opinion that politics requires men of some training, talent, speaking ability and prestige in the community. "Politics" in the good sense, as in the phrase "good government", was generally described as "administration". Thus Premier Manning's government was often referred as "that good administration". And certain respondents distinguished between Robert Thompson as a "good administrator" and Réal Caouette as a "consummate politician", seeming to imply that the former was the more admirable quality. All of the respondents expressed a desire for reform in politics. Politics should have higher standards and should be made once again the instrument of the people rather than of a small privileged segment.

## 2. Religion and Politics

Certain significant differences between "western" Social Crediters and "nouveaux" Créditistes on the one hand, and "old" Créditistes on the other, emerge in their definition of the relationship between metaphysical principles, religion, and Social Credit theory, and practical politics. A number of "old" Créditistes were anxious to demonstrate a close link between the former theory and the latter practice.

For Laurent Legault politics is the application of natural law principles to the temporal world. Social Credit doctrine is the closest approximation to this philosophy that





has emerged thus far. "What struck me the most about Douglas' doctrine is that I found that Douglas wrote his whole doctrine in conformity with nature."

"I admire natural things very much. For example, we poison the air with our automobiles and our motors, and the Good Lord cleans it all free of charge. The next day it's pure. He cleans water free of charge as well. I say to myself, man is born with his needs on the earth and natural law has him born with a stomach; natural law has also permitted the apple tree to blossom every spring. Then what struck me about Douglas' doctrine is that it is always in conformity with this natural law. It's that the fruits of nature are made to balance (rencontrent). Even today what is most repugnant to me is to see that 2/3 of human beings are deprived of nature's fruits. I am not at all infatuated (un toqué) with it, one would say, in the bad sense of the word. I could accept another doctrine better than Social Credit immediately, were it to appear.<sup>1</sup>"

Réal Caouette was only slightly less emphatic on the same point.

"I found out that the teachings of the Pope, especially Pope Pius XI in his encyclical *Politico Anno* (sic) were in complete accordance with Social Credit theory. The Pope said, for instance: those who control the credit and money, or the economic blood of the country, are in control of our economic life. That situation no one can change. Then he gave us an economic goal to attain, namely a system under which each and every person will be assured of a vital minimum, at least enough to live a decent life. Now that was absolutely in accord with Douglas' theory. So I studied all the Church's economic teachings. I learned them all in, I would say, three years ....."

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<sup>1</sup> Interview, April, 1964. The subsequent quotations are also from interviews.



At the same time, there is a clear tendency on the part of the latter to draw a much sharper distinction between the spiritual and temporal realms:

"They (the Church teachings) were not complete. Their aims were alright, the philosophy was alright, but to help apply all those nice principles, we would need Social Credit."

It is also reflected in his desire to distinguish his own movement from that of the Union des Electeurs:

"We believe in the same Social Credit as Louis Even, but when they mix up religion with Social Credit, I don't go for it. I am a good Catholic, as good a Catholic as there may be, but trying to organize a religious movement and saying: Here now, you have to be a Catholic to be a Social Crediter, or to be a good Social Crediter you have to be a good Catholic -- I don't go along with that at all, because Social Credit is an economic system, it is just as good for a Protestant, a Jew, for any person in the world. Don't mix religion into it."

In contrast, Laurent Legault is ready to acknowledge the close inter-relationship of religious and political principles, of the spiritual and temporal realms.

"Listen: Man is obliged to live with his soul, I mean that he is incapable of releasing his soul from his body at least until he dies. I don't think that one should place religion completely outside of politics. Religious principles must remain with one in work, politics, or anywhere. Even if you study, your religious convictions and principles are going to stay with you... We are Christians. As Christians, we must act in a Christian manner, even in politics."





It is in this latter, somewhat fine distinction between two men with quite similar Social Credit backgrounds that one sees in microcosm the potential for constructing what might be described as a "religious orientation" continuum. At one end of the continuum is the attitude of such long-standing Union des Electeurs leaders as Louis Even and Gilberte Côté-Mercier. Their stand on these questions is clear. "Social Credit is applied Christianity."<sup>1</sup> Those members of their movement who split with them and joined with Caouette were generally opposed to such an extreme attitude. There are among these Ralliement members those who, like Legault, continue to see close affinities between Catholicism and Social Credit theory, which they would even allow to influence their political activity. But they reject categorically the attempt to convert Social Credit propaganda into Catholic evangelism. "We must act as Christians even in politics, but at the same time not make ourselves propagandists of a religion or submit ourselves to preaching the gospel, when that is not our domain. In sum, we must live according to the gospel and not preach it in politics". (Legault)

A much larger group in the Ralliement share the more sectarian attitudes of Réal Caouette. These include former members of the Union des Electeurs who had belonged and

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<sup>1</sup> Vers Demain, Volume 1, 1939-40.



even worked hard for the movement despite their strong objections to the mixing up of religion and politics. "I was a 100% Cr ditiste but when they (the berets blancs) left the church and I saw their white berets, I snuck away in order to avoid meeting one of them. Really, they made themselves look ridiculous. At the very doors of churches, when the mayors of municipalities tried to send them away, they got into their automobiles (sur les machines) and cried out ... (I).

"Monsieur and Mme Mercier threw me out of the movement because I dared to criticize them, their methods of propaganda, namely mixing up religious with social questions, because I found that Social Credit is a temporal doctrine while the other aspect is spiritual. Thus I considered that it was not a good thing to mix the two together. ...Spiritual questions should be left to experts, namely pastors, Protestant ministers and Catholic priests. It's for others to concern themselves with such spiritual matters. It's right for us to follow moral precepts, all that, but in teaching it, it is better to leave such things to people who are qualified, and concern ourselves with temporal matters". (I).

They also include those who, for one reason or another, but especially because of the religious practices and allied methods of the Union des Electeurs, had never joined that earlier movement. "Even in the time of Vers Demain there were some good things in their operation, but they turned to religion, they mixed up religion too much with politics,





unfortunately, that was done too much..." (E) "I found that their operation was ridiculoux, ... this idea of mixing in prayers, during public demonstrations, of singing hymns and all that, I found it completely out of place". (T).

One former supporter of Caouette, who is now inactive, expressed these views most clearly: "I was interested in Social Credit before, but the only spokesmen before Mr. Caouette was Mme Gilberte Côté-Mercier and, unhappily, although perhaps she is a very good person, she touches on too many subject which don't interest me... When I want to pray, I go to Church... When I want to involve myself in politics, above all from the economic point of view, I interest myself in economic theory. We could easily have in our ranks people who belong to the Catholic religion, and people who believe in Protestantism, but Mme Gilberte Côté-Mercier only accepted people who believed in the Catholic religion. I am a Catholic, and a good one. I believe sincerely in it; only I don't believe that it should be mixed up with economic theory. Thus I followed Mr. Caouette, who was also a good Catholic like myself, but who didn't mix up religious things with the economic theory of Social Credit." He continued, "I never followed that movement (boxets blancs) because I found that they had strange ideas, that it wasn't normal for individuals who were healthy and balanced in mind to adhere to this kind of sect. Above all, we are accustomed as Catholics to discuss religious affairs and



religious courses. Those who want to practice religion have religious communities where they can enter and devote themselves to worship. They can become a part of religious societies in their parishes. Therefore to want to engage in a politico-economic-religious activity -- I found that inconsistent. There is an incontestable difference between the Caouette group and that (berets blancs) group." (K).

In their perception of the relationship of religion to politics, the Alberta group seemed to have drawn an even more sharply defined distinction. In this sense they had moved far away from the attitude of their former leader, Mr. Aberhart, who had incorporated Social Credit into his Bible Broadcasts every Sunday morning and from Mr. Manning, who still appears on The Bible Hour. The attitude of Mr. Thompson who was a Protestant missionary himself of sorts in Africa, may be taken as representative. "The old-time Cr ditistes like Louis Even, Joe Marcotte, and Mercier, they mixed other things with Social Credit; they practically made a religious cult of it... it is only when you mix up these other things that it makes Social Credit appear ridiculous. I have a basic philosophy in life, which I think is very practical: If you can't sell yourself, you can never sell your products, so why get them all mixed up in inessentials." (Thompson).





On the surface, then, the subject of religion was not a source of conflict between the two groups despite the fact that they were composed respectively of almost 100% strongly Catholic Cr ditistes and almost 100% Protestant and evangelical Social Crediters from the west. In the early days of both movements, religion had played a large role in the propaganda efforts to spread the doctrine. It also appeared to contribute to the estrangement in the relations between the two groups in the late 1940's (although each alleged tolerance of the other's religious beliefs within the broader confines of Christianity).<sup>1</sup> When Caouette formed his movement in 1958 as a secular political group concerned exclusively with things temporal, such strains were, it seemed, automatically removed. Yet certain attitudes not always transparent may have lingered on. Premier Manning's attitudes and those of Alberta Social Credit League President Orvis A. Kennedy are worth exploring in this regard.<sup>2</sup>

It is not our purpose at this juncture however, to analyze the precise role, if any, which these differing "religious attitudes" might have played in the split. Each cannot be treated in isolation, but must be considered as part

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<sup>1</sup> See for example, the strong pro-Catholic statements by Louis Even, ch. 3 above p. 52, note and p. 53, note 1.

<sup>2</sup> Both Manning and Kennedy still appear regularly on the Sunday Bible Hour broadcast over Calgary radio.



of an overall attitudinal syndrome -- an orientation to belief systems, authority, and political ideology. We defer this task until later.<sup>1</sup>

### 3. Beliefs about authority and leadership:

The problem of authority and leadership was also of central concern to the Cr ditistes because of the former unhappy experience of many of them in the Union des Electeurs. The "one and sole boss of the Union des Electeurs", as Caouette himself saw it, was Mme Gilberte C t -Mercier.

The unlimited scope of Mme Mercier's dictatorial control is attested to by all those interviewed. Laurent Legault described the manner in which she had interfered with campaign plans in 1948, by selecting candidates who satisfied her own (and ill-advised) qualifications of service and devotion, rather than talent and prestige.<sup>2</sup> A former member of the Union des Electeurs said of her "I found her too dictatorial. It was "believe or die". Do what one tells you or else remove yourself from our ranks. She is still the same, she hasn't changed". (F) And the writer's own experience in interviewing her was that, while not unpleasant, she is an impatient woman, who always wants to establish her opinion on something as definitive.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See below, p.167 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Interview, Summer, 1965.

<sup>3</sup> Interview, May, 1965, at Maison St-Michel.





It is interesting that a number of the respondents who still count themselves as members of the Ralliement found similar dictatorial attitudes in Caouette which they often attributed to his training in the "school of Gilberte".

According to one staunch admirer of Caouette's, "Gilberte Coté had her faults, but in indoctrinating people to work benevolently like that all their lives, she had a powerful thrust (un poing épouvantable). Now (Caouette) was educated by Gilberte, and now he has left her follies behind. But that man, he also has a powerful thrust. Whenever we had caucuses, if there was a little difference of opinion, Caouette arrived and then 'bang, bang' (toug, toug) everybody was clearly beaten. There is a Maurice Duplessis number two". (E) Not all, however, were quite so generous in their evaluation of these qualities.

"As leader, Caouette doesn't know enough about how to instil confidence in his men. He .. doesn't submit (se soumet) to an idea which has been discussed in a group, in the organization, in the ranks of the movement. That's what's wrong (with him)." (W).

And further on, "one must give Caouette his due. But he wasn't sufficiently democratic in the movement. Caouette, is an impulsive man.... He speaks on the basis of impression (sur le coup de l'impression). Before speaking, he doesn't discuss the matter at all with others. He never takes advice...

Then, that's what's wrong with him." (W) Still another remarked "I can tell you sincerely that M. Caouette is a student of Mme Coté and he inherited a little from her. I am



still in the Ralliement and I am in favour of Réal Caouette. Only I don't admire everything he does nor everything he says neither. I find him a little too dictatorial. He is less so than Gilberte, but he is still a little too much so himself. I forgive him a bit because he was brought up like that ...."(I).

Those who remained with Thompson were quick to point to this quality as a major exacerbating factor in the split. Caouette's followers were blindly obedient to his decisions. "They accepted only with much difficulty decisions other than those of their leader. Gilberte was for them a kind of God; they also had the mentality of listening blindly to the decisions of Réal Caouette. That is certainly one of the reasons that made Caouette and his group begin to believe that the English (-speaking members) didn't want to cooperate, because they also had questions to ask and arguments to make which they felt to be necessary." (U). In other words, it was the very questioning of authority that was regarded as alien by certain segments of the Ralliement. The dissenter was in some sense disloyal to the leader: this was the attitude which Gilberte Côté-Mercier had attempted to inculcate in the ranks of the "berets blancs". If the attitude towards Caouette as leader was any indication, she had succeeded in this task to a remarkable degree.





A Social Credit M.P. from the West seemed to share a similar perception of Caouette's relationship to his followers. Robert Thompson, who as a follower of Manning was clearly not averse to strong, even dictatorial leadership, commented, "Mr. Caouette is more intent to kill internal criticism than to kill the real opposition, and this is where he is defeating his own purpose. Constantly he is throwing out those who cannot get along with him, and he becomes smaller and smaller. He is just repeating the very same thing. It is another cycle. Like it was with Gilberte Côté".

Our own observation from watching Caouette operate at various Cr ditiste Congresses is that as a leader, he exerts his authority to the full. When an issue is being seriously debated, Caouette can step in and resolve it in a moment. Generally there is little or no questioning of his, the leader's opinion. When a dissenting voice is raised occasionally at conventions, it is generally quickly quelled. This was the case at Granby, where Caouette rejected Thompson's leadership and took steps to establish his own primacy over the national party. It was again the case at Montreal (January, 1964), Quebec (August, 1964, March 1965) and St. Jerome (August, 1965) where much quarreling, debate and discussion, was followed by an intervention by Caouette. In each case his word was definitive. There was no further discussion.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Observations made by the author while attending each of these conventions.



Other leaders of the Ralliement such as deputy leader Gilles Grégoire and President Laurent Legault are likewise able to assert their authority in conventions, merely by intervening and resolving seemingly insoluble disputes.

It is further clear from the definitions offered or implied by most respondents of what constitutes real leadership, as opposed to diplomacy or administrative ability, that authoritarianism is closely associated with the former. Caouette and Thompson were often compared according to these criteria. "I have much admiration for Mr. Thompson...but he lacks the qualities of a leader. He is a thinker, maybe a bit of a dreamer." (W). "I say that Mr. Thompson was a national figure, but not like Mr. Caouette. He would have made a better prime minister than Mr. Caouette in administration, but not as a leader who could lead, only as a facade." (G). "In my opinion, Thompson was not a man to put at the head of the party. In my opinion, he wasn't the leader. It isn't because he doesn't speak well, ... he speaks very well... It isn't because he doesn't cut a good image, he has a pleasing image... this is a good-looking man. He is a man with a good record. One cannot reproach him for his record, but when it comes to coping with political troubles, in my opinion he isn't a man. I think that if I were in his place, I would do better than he, even though I am ignorant. I am nothing but a poor devil who has little education." (L).





In summary, just as a continuum on religious orientations can be drawn, in which the attitudes of the former members of the "berets blancs" converge at one extreme, likewise a continuum can be constructed for authority patterns in which the attitudes of the "old" Creditistes tend to cluster around one polar extreme. Despite their adverse opinion of Gilberte Côté's dictatorial methods, they had once more succumbed to their use by her pupil. The "new" Cr ditistes recognized this tendency and reacted against it. It is not surprising therefore that given the choice, they followed the milder leadership of Robert Thompson. Authority patterns together with religious orientation patterns and attitudes toward belief systems in general were dominant factors in determining the ultimate form of the split.

#### 4. Attitudes toward Ideologies and Belief Systems:

Differences in ideology were cited by Caouette as a major catalyst for the split. He accused Robert Thompson and his Western Social Credit colleagues of abandoning orthodox Social Credit doctrine. He claimed that his own group of "old" Cr ditistes were the only real Douglasites left in the party. He cited instances in which Robert Thompson had manifested a desire to modernize the doctrine, and to drop such central tenets as the national dividend, the debt-free payments in family allowances and pensions, and the anti-austerity orientation. Responses indicate that Caouette's



observations were substantially correct. In answer to the question - do you consider yourself to be an orthodox Social Crediter, Mr. Thompson replied: "I believe in the principles, Mr. Douglas enunciated. This does not just apply to economic principles... but the thing is that our situation today is far different than it was in the days when Douglas first explained Social Credit principles. We had no social services at all from government, none of what we know as the welfare state was here. Certainly automation had not been developed as it has been developed since. We have moved into an age of plenty, and then we were still operating in an age of scarcity. Thus when I talk Social Credit, I don't talk necessarily in the same phraseology nor do I 'dot the same i's' as Douglas did. But I believe I speak the basic principles of Social Credit. I express it in terms that make some sense. After all, if you can't sell your product, what is the use of trying to sell it." In other words, Mr. Thompson's attitude towards Social Credit doctrine is a highly pragmatic and instrumental one. If the doctrine can no longer win converts, then don't use the doctrine. "And so, Mr. Caouette and others say that I am not an orthodox Social Crediter. That may be so in the sense that I do not use the phrases and all the jargon that so many Social Crediters are accustomed to, because I think it is not accepted. Consequently, I have applied Douglas' principles to the situation that we have today."





The "new" Creditistes who remained with Mr. Thompson after the split were likewise attacked by Caouette for their lack of concern for doctrine. Evidence also supports his allegations here. In reply to the question - are you an orthodox Douglassite - "S" asserted: "No, I have never been in favour of anything one hundred per cent. What I found in Douglas' theory was that you have to respect the human being. It's the first problem today, but since the year 1935 many things have changed, so you cannot be one hundred per cent with Douglas. We have to follow the trends. What I admit in Social Credit is that the birth of credit comes through chartered banks and accrues to their Profit. This profit comes from nothing except pure creation of credit. This should not come from the banks. The Bank of Canada or any other government-organized bank should issue it. That is about all that I admit in Social Credit."

"T" revealed a similar attitude in a more oblique fashion: "What troubled me a little at the National Convention was this impression that I had that the majority of the delegates were idealists. Evidently they saw in Social Credit a 'better world' and their concern seemed almost to be the terrestrial paradise. I said to myself - we are on earth; we are going to remain here; we are human beings; it's absolutely impossible to realize by economic and social measures what these people imagine will be realized in their world of dreams. I said - these fellows, they are going to come back to earth soon, and



then they are going to find that it is not completely like their dreams. In principle, the theory is very nice. In application, it's always necessary to keep one's two feet on the ground... It's necessary to stay on the ground, to see problems in their proper dimensions and to consider that human beings will always be human, and that nothing will ever be perfect on earth." "T" also commented on the doctrinal orthodoxy of the other "new" Creditistes. "Of Marcel Lessard he said: "Moderately Creditiste, like me, moderately." Of Doctor Marcoux: "In my opinion, he is a man of Social Credit temperament; he is not a doctrinaire." Finally, on Robert Thompson and the Western Social Crediters: "I know that the men with Thompson are not Social Crediters, just as one says that Thompson himself is not a Social Crediter. The members from the West are not Social Crediters; Bennett is not a Social Crediter; Manning is not a Social Crediter. There are only a few others among them who are Social Crediters."

Caouette's group were emphatic in their effort to identify themselves as orthodox Social Crediters. Caouette himself declared: "I consider myself to be a Douglasite, a one hundred per cent orthodox Social Crediter, because when Douglas gave the world his theory in 1918, at that time there were still some production problems in some parts of the world, but today in the age of atomic energy, power and everything, with increasing facility in the use of machines in place of man,





Douglas' theory is more applicable than it was in 1918." In answer to the question - do you still subscribe to the  $A + B$  theorem and to the need to fill the gap in purchasing power - Caouette retorted: "The  $A + B$  theory, it is more true today than ever. Never, never, unless we have a lot of something, never will the national income in one year buy the production of that year. And when Douglas says that  $A$  will never be able to buy  $A + B$  at a specific time, in a given time, it will always be true. But when they say at the end, in ten years from now, the actual existing production will be sold, it is true at that time. As it would be right for me to say, here, everyone that is born today will eventually die. So the total deaths equal the total births. Then there is no increase in population. That is the actual reasoning of the economists. But in a given time we all know that a man, a boy, or a child, one will live eighty-five years, another one forty, another one twenty-five. The factor time provides the whole answer. We all know that at the end we will all be dead, but in the meantime there is an increase in population every year and every day. Do you admit that? The economic system is exactly like that. In a given year, or in a given period, the  $A$  will never buy the  $A + B$ . And in ten years, when the  $A + B$  of today will be sold, in those ten years, we will have produced probably one million times what was produced before." Finally, in his perception of the orthodoxy of Manning and Albertan Social Crediters, Caouette remarked: "Manning knows



his Social Credit perfectly well ... but he stopped fighting for Social Credit. That is what I have against Manning at this time. He knows Social Credit, but he says we have to modernize. Modernize what? What was evil fifty years ago is still evil today. What was good fifty years ago is still good today. There is no being right yesterday and being wrong today. Either you are right or wrong. Manning is right today when he speaks about Social Credit, but he is wrong in the administration of Social Credit." In distinguishing himself from Manning and Thompson with respect to Social Credit doctrine and its modernization, Caouette stated: "I follow all of Douglas' theory one hundred percent. They do not any more. They are mostly a conservative organization which upholds the old traditions and doesn't move forward... Now we believe that Douglas is right and that Douglas has to be modernized, but the modernization comes from Manning and Thompson, it does not come from Douglas."

Caouette did not distinguish himself from the followers of Louis Even and Mme Gilberte Côté-Mercier in doctrinal orthodoxy: "We follow the same Social Credit as Louis Even and Gilberte Côté, but when they mix up religion with Social Credit, I don't go for it."

Laurent Legault was just as emphatic about his orthodoxy. When asked if he considered himself an orthodox Social Crediter, he replied without hesitation: "Yes, and I find that it is





necessary to insist more and more on the fact that money and purchasing power must be distributed to the people otherwise than by salaries, and without conditions. I find that Douglas' two propositions, the national dividend and the compensatory rebate (*l'escompte compensé*) are still the best means of issuing money. I find that Messrs. Thompson and Manning attach too many conditions to this, conditional methods to achieve the end of giving purchasing power to the people. I prefer Douglas, who brings it about without any conditions." In response to the problems of modernization, and the possible utopian content of Douglas' theory, Legault stated: "It's not utopian because it's really what exists today. There is proof. Write to the Minister of Finance and to the President of the Bank of Canada, and they are obliged to admit to you that credit is ninety-five per cent of the business of our country. And credit whether you like it or not, is simply controlled by a pen."

Legault like Caouette, made no basic distinction between himself and the followers of Louis Even and Gilberte Côté: "From the point of view of doctrine and principles, we don't distinguish ourselves from them at all. They advocate the same thing."

Gilles Grégoire, showed a more subtle awareness of what doctrinal orthodoxy implied: "I think I can consider myself an orthodox Social Crediter. We cannot say Douglas Social



Crediter, but rather those who follow his ideas. Douglas expounded his ideas in 1918. Many situations have changed since then, so we have to adapt ourselves in accordance with the circumstances while retaining the main principles which are the fundamental basis for monetary and financial reform. I still subscribe to the  $A + B$  theorem." When asked if he considered this theorem to be the key to the doctrine, Grégoire explained: "It is not a key or a principle. It is only an illustration. It is an illustration of why we do have a deficiency in production. The major principle of Social Credit is control of credit by the Bank of Canada or if you are in the United States, by an official bank."

On the face of it, it would seem as if the attitudes of the Caouette group of "old" Social Crediters could again be placed at the extreme of the ideological continuum. The attitudes of the "new" Créditistes would appear to lie somewhere closer along the continuum to those of Western Social Crediters. In other words, the Caouettistes are the ideologists, the Thompsonists are more pragmatic. However, "S" in his analysis of the doctrinal outlook of the Caouette group, has raised one caveat. He has suggested that the leaders of this group used the ideology purely as a means to further their own ends, and do not really believe in it themselves. That is, ideology for the leaders of the Caouettistes is an instrumental concept rather than a true reflection of their primitive beliefs.





In his words, "I believe sincerely that Caouette does not believe in Social Credit. I have the profound impression that Caouette is a faker who never believed in Social Credit doctrine. There remains with him still the remnants of the theory that he absorbed at the time of Louis Even and Gilberte Coté, and which doesn't interest him at all. Caouette is a talking-machine, a fellow who enjoys holding the crowd in the palm of his hand... He knows the theory, because he has previously studied it, but it doesn't interest him. When Caouette says - "S" isn't a Social Crediter - he doesn't know that that is so. That annoys me, because I know that he is the one who does not believe. Like Grégoire, he doesn't believe in any of it. There are fellows who don't have principles."

"S" does not deny that a number of the Members of Parliament who followed Caouette were true believers in the doctrine: "Latulippe, Laprise, Dionne, and Bélanger of Charlevoix, they are men who studied with Gilberte and Louis Even and who can't see anything else other than that, and that which was written thirty years ago is as true today as it was thirty years ago. They can't possibly appreciate that the circumstances which surround the economic life of a country can change. For them, the doctrine is immutable. Now Caouette, with Grégoire, because Grégoire is an able intelligent fellow, they keep them in line with orthodoxy."



There is a good deal of evidence to support "S's" contention insofar as it applies to Gilles Grégoire. Grégoire himself was never a member of the "berets blancs". His attitudes towards doctrine reflect a clearer understanding of the relationship between doctrine and reality, theory and practice, than does Caouette's or Legault's. Grégoire's decision to join Caouette, rather than remain with Thompson was largely opportunistic. As a French Canadian, he realized that he needed Caouette to further his own political career. Sound evidence supports his judgement, for "S" who was initially elected with a very large plurality, lost his seat in the election following the split. Grégoire on the other hand was re-elected with a comfortable margin.

The cases of Caouette and Legault are, however, more complex. "S" has admitted that Caouette believed in the doctrine at one time. Despite the strategic and tactical advantages to be gained from a more moderate interpretation of the doctrine, Caouette persists in his rigid orthodoxy. In spite of the fact that Caouette's interest lie in politics rather than in doctrine, and that his talents are also in politics, Caouette has accepted the doctrine of Douglas without modification. He has then managed to use his consummate skills as a political tactician to adapt the doctrine of Major Douglas so that it produces political benefit. Caouette is then as much of a true believer today as he was fifteen or twenty years ago; only his skills as a political tactician and his involvement





with the political process have increased commensurately with his political experience.

As for Legault, he has been and continues to be a 'true believer'. He has moreover adapted the doctrine to fit his own metaphysical and religious premises. This has further strengthened his commitment to the theories of Major Douglas. His involvement in politics is not as intense or as total as is that of Caouette. He is therefore the least likely of all leaders of the Ralliement to sacrifice doctrine to the pressures of political expediency.

The rest of the members are more or less 'true believers' depending on their degree of sophistication and their ability to articulate their philosophic and economic premises. Generally those who are incapable of articulating beliefs, show little concern for doctrine per se, and are willing to accept doctrinal interpretations provided by the leadership. In other words, attitudes towards authority then determine their attitudes towards doctrine.

In summary, then, Caouette and Legault with their followers can be located at the polar extreme of the ideological spectrum, along with the former members of the "berets blancs". The "new" Creditistes are much closer to the centre of the spectrum, ranging from those supporters of the doctrine before the emergence of Caouette to those whose adherence was mere payment of lip service to the doctrine of the party under whose



banner they ran. Good examples of this group are Maurice Côté, on the one hand, and Gérard Girouard on the other. The Western Social Crediters approximate those of the "new" Créditistes of Quebec. Premier Manning, formerly a staunch adherent of Social Credit doctrine, now recognizes its limitations as a practical guide to policy, and thus can be classified with Côté. H.A. Olsen, on the other hand, a relative newcomer to Social Credit who uses Social Credit doctrine to further his own political position, can be classified with Girouard or perhaps Frenette.

Finally, the tendency of a member to express himself in ideological terms, and particularly, the way in which he holds his doctrinal beliefs, seems to correlate with his attitudes towards authority. In general, a Créditiste who would rank high as an ideologist is also an admirer of authoritarian behaviour and strong leadership. This is understandable, since the leadership in the Créditiste group has always assumed a posture of complete devotion to Douglas Social Credit. If the authority of the leader is accepted, presumably his own attitude towards the doctrine will be accepted. Or the doctrine itself may take on a certain aura of authority independent of the leadership itself. If charges had been laid and had been well-documented to the effect that Caouette, by his parliamentary and press statements, had abandoned orthodox Social Credit





positions on austerity, budgetary policy, and social welfare payments, the "true believers" in the party might have been less inclined to follow his lead at the time of the split. There is even some evidence for this in the attitudes expressed by certain of the less politically-minded Cr ditistes. A number of respondents who showed a lack of interest in politics per se, and were more concerned about the advancement of the doctrine in French Canada, were critical of Caouette's political motives for effecting the split. They felt that unity was essential for the effective promulgation and spreading of Social Credit. It was Caouette's efforts to discredit the "new Cr ditistes" and the western Social Crediters under Thompson as doctrinal heretics that largely convinced them to remain nominally in his camp. But their discontent generally manifested itself in an unwillingness to work as energetically or as enthusiastically for the movement as they had in the past.

There is a much less clear correlation between attitudes towards religion and tendency to ideologizing.<sup>1</sup> Those who most fervently proclaimed their desire to separate religion from politics were often those who manifested the greatest concern for doctrinal orthodoxy. There are a number of possible explanations for this. In the first place, many of the "old Cr ditistes" who had formerly been members of the Union des

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<sup>1</sup> The term "ideologizing" is used by Robert Lane, op. cit., p. 353.



Electeurs had decided to separate from that movement primarily because of their determination to keep their religious and political activities distinct. The "berets blancs" had tended to mix religion and politics too much; this was repeated over and over again in our interviews. Those inclined to "ideologizing" then tended to adopt a rigid position of sharply separating the two. In this attempted separation, they were often being more dogmatic than realistic. The separation itself became part of their new definition of the doctrine. This same pattern reveals itself in the response to questions concerning the social as opposed to economic aspects of the doctrine. The Union des Electeurs had declared Douglas' theory to be as much a social as an economic doctrine. The Cr ditistes who had joined Caouette were much more inclined to emphasize the economic side. A number of them declared the theory to be purely economic in nature, and more particularly, to concern itself almost exclusively with monetary reform. This revealed a similar concern with things temporal as opposed to spiritual, and a desire to keep the two as distinct as possible.

A second explanation which is not mutually exclusive of the first, is that articulated religious attitudes do not really correspond to internally-held orientations on such matters. The subject of religion is by nature a personal and confidential one. It is part of Catholic teaching that it should be kept so. The responses of the Cr ditistes interviewed may not, then,





have represented the true attitudes of these people on the subject. There is some evidence for this in the way in which one of the leaders articulated his more private prejudices against Jews and Negroes to the interviewer when he felt he was not being recorded, and only after he was assured that the interviewer was, like himself, a Christian.<sup>1</sup>

#### 5. Attitudes towards democracy:

It was more difficult to gather significant data on the respondents' real as opposed to articulated attitudes towards democracy as a system of government and as an ideal. Most of them paid lip-service to the ideal and to the parliamentary and cabinet form which it takes in Canada at present. On the other hand, there was much disgruntlement with the party system as it relates to democracy, and in particular, with its dependence on "election funds" (caisse électorale).

Créditistes of all stripes, both "old" and "new" groups, and Social Crediters from out west seemed to share these attitudes. Real differences were apparent, however, in more indirect references to the problem.

For example, "C" asserted that "It is necessary to operate in politics with men elected by the people, financed by the people, and attached to the people and not to the party "caisses".

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<sup>1</sup> Interview with "C" June, 1964. He spoke about the Rothschilds and the element of justice in Hitler's genocide policy. A comparison was made with the negroes.



Our conception of politics is that the deputy is the representative of his electors and not, as in the old political parties, the representative of the leader in the constituency. You know what happens automatically, one will refer to the candidate of Mr. Kennedy, the candidate of Mr. Johnson in such and such a party. We consider that the politician must be a candidate of the people, and it must not happen that he has masters other than his own electors, which doesn't however prevent him from being part of a group. These are principles which are quite profound and are difficult to explain in 2 or 3 minutes." One of the "new Cr ditiste" M.P.'s who remained with Thompson after the split expressed a profound concern to make himself easily accessible to his constituents on a day-to-day basis. This was, in fact, the main plank in his platform in both the 1962 and 1963 elections.<sup>1</sup> Another former representative of the Ralliement on the National Social Credit executive said of Jean Lesage, in relation to democratic politics, "He is well-intentioned, Jean Lesage, agreed that he is well-intentioned. He has done enormous good. Now, it's necessary that he not remain in power too long, because they will then become ... a bad government. It is necessary that the government be changed again." (W). Another proclaimed "The sole method in a democracy to show that you are against one party is to vote for another." (U).

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<sup>1</sup> The M.P. was Jean-Louis Frenette. Interview, 1965.





The attitudes articulated by Social Credit Leader Robert Thompson are approximately the same. "In the U.S., in Canada, in all of our western countries, somehow or other, we have to bring politics back to a level where people will respect that which is the only way we can govern ourselves and remain a free society. It is not easy. I remember Churchill once said that democracy is the worst possible government invented by men, except every other kind of government." And further on, "The real reason we are in trouble today is because our party system has failed. Today many of our politicians are more concerned about perpetuating a party than they are in doing what is the responsibility of government to do, and it is when we get away from this, when we form a national government where men of mutual concern and integrity get together to do things in the right way, regardless of party labels, that we will have the kind of government we should. The same thing is wrong in the U.S.A. If I were to move to the States I wouldn't know whether to join the Democrats or the Republicans because I find they are equally as broad in the political spectrum of socialism versus private enterprise. Both have the same weaknesses...." There is here the same apparent general acceptance of democracy and its principles, as well as the same criticism of the party system as it presently functions. There is, moreover, a certain tolerance for qualifications to pure democracy. With respect to the organization of party congresses in relation to internal



democracy, Thompson allowed that "what you say about democracy is something, I suppose, which is relative"... I understand the accusations made against (Legault) as far as democracy is concerned, but in the plain, hard reality of life, when you do get an organization, there has to be some leadership given. Most people are followers, and I suppose a leader can be accused of being dictatorial, but I am sure that Legault was not that. I think that he was just careful to see what happened was for the good of what he was trying to reach." It could hardly be said, then, that Mr. Thompson and other western Social Crediters articulate a more jealous concern for upholding the principles of democracy than do the Cr ditistes.

However, in some of the less explicit references to democracy there are indications of a profound gap (in real attitudes and understanding) between "old"Cr ditistes, "new" Cr ditistes, and western Social Crediters. "C's" description of his "ideal" political system is a case in point. "That is what obliges us from Quebec to avoid the same faux-pas (as the Albertans) and form an elite which will always keep the movement within the bounds of (dans le sens de) Social Credit doctrine. You can call a government Social Credit which might pass laws completely contrary to Social Credit principles. Who, then, would keep this group on the right path except an elite? That's what obliges us to form this elite. I attach much more importance to this elite than I attach to candidates or to a government education (formation)." When questioned about the





relationship of this appointed group to the elected representatives of the people and to democracy, "C" explained, "Listen I'm not in disagreement with (the democratic principle) here. Authority will always rest in the elected government. But this elite, at a given moment, may face a Social Credit Government which doesn't administer any longer within the meaning of the technique, of the philosophy. Well, then we will do exactly what international finance does when a government no longer wants to follow its directives. The Social Credit elite will organize itself in the next election in order to produce other men who will administer within the bounds of the doctrine. But the authority will always remain with the people..." In a more private discussion, "C" admitted that he could not fully appreciate the benefits of elected government. A corporate-type government seemed to be the solution ... one organized "in the hierarchical form of the Roman Catholic Church."

These attitudes may not, of course, be peculiar to Cr ditistes, or to French Canadians. The Alberta Social Crediters had transformed their plebiscitarian democratic notions into a virtual cabinet dictatorship. There is no real opposition in Alberta, and Premier Manning seems to show little concern for promoting one. Efficient administration is a much more central concern. Robert Thompson's desire for "national non-party government" reflects the same tradition. And yet, one would expect a profounder regard for the forms of democracy, a



greater understanding of the identification of the parliamentary and cabinet system with a uniquely Canadian tradition, among the western Social Crediters. This hypothesis lacks empirical verification at present. But it is one which ought to be explored.

E) THE FIRST DIMENSION OF CREDITISTE CULTURE: NATIONAL IDENTITY.

Verba has outlined four major dimensions which are intended to define political cultures. The first dimension is that of national identity.

Our respondents revealed their feelings of national identity in three major ways:

- 1) in their own self-identification as French Canadians or Catholics, or both:
- 2) in the priority which they gave to Quebec as opposed to other provinces and even as opposed to Canada as a whole;
- 3) in their image of western Canada and western Social Credit.

1) French Canadians and/or Catholics

Vers Demain in its first issue in 1939, had identified itself as an organ of Catholic and French-speaking Social Crediters. All through its era of predominance in Quebec Social Credit, it continued to express strongly Catholic and nationalist views.





This identification with nationality and religion continued to manifest itself in the attitudes of former members of the "berets blancs". Réal Caouette made reference to papal encyclicals in his attempt to give a philosophic rationale to Social Credit doctrine. "C" gave a philosophic basis to his nationalism:

"God created man and woman who form a unity. Before Canada was discovered there were tribes. They formed their own group together and they spoke the same dialect... It's natural that those who speak the same language, who understand each other, form a group around a church bell, a parish. You can see everywhere in Ontario people of the same religion (grouping themselves together). United Church people like to form a group around a church. It's normal that one group of people who speak the same language and who have the same convictions seek to group together. It's natural..."

"New" Social Crediters were not generally as insistent on this point. "S" whose father was "a nationalist, like Bourassa", shrugged his shoulders at the suggestion that it was unwise for him to side with Mr. Thompson, an Anglo-Saxon Protestant, from a nationalist point of view. "With this nationalist sentiment in Quebec that we have now, many people who are in favour of our group and were not in favour of Caouette are accusing us of betraying our nationality, saying we have preferred an English Protestant over a French-Canadian Catholic, and we know that Caouette has been very insistent on this point."



But he only used that because he had no other weapon against us. Frenette is a good man, Côté is a strong nationalist, almost a separatist. He was with the Saint-Jean Baptiste Society every year. All of us are good men, and strong nationalists. Caouette didn't know what to do (about our joining with Thompson) so he said "They are bad French-Canadians, they are traitors!"

"T" observed that the nationalist factor had influenced him first to vote for Caouette at the 1961 Social Credit national leadership convention. But on the next ballot he had switched his vote to Mr. Thompson, whom he regarded as more responsible. When asked to explain this behavior, he confided, "My personal feeling is this: I prefer to see a good English Canadian direct the destinies of our country or the destinies of a political party than a bad French Canadian, one who is incompetent, or incapable. Because, at a given moment, the leader of a political party has a national action to take. He must consider and ultimately analyze all problems at a national level. And then, at this moment, it takes a breadth of vision which is sufficiently extended, sufficiently great, something which I didn't see in Caouette. Caouette is a nationalist, perhaps to an extreme at times, perhaps even fanatical. That's why I preferred Thompson, whom I considered a good English Canadian. Because ordinarily my nationalism is not so far-reaching: a Canadian is a Canadian, whether he speaks English or French, inasmuch as he is a good citizen, in my opinion, they're the same".





And in assessing the role which nationalism played in the split, he admitted that "there were many questions concerned with nationalism which were involved". But he denigrated these factors as they affected him personally. "But nationalism, I am a nationalist, everybody is a nationalist, but in different degrees. And one should try to be honest about one's nationalism. I often say to people, "Be respectable, and people will respect you". That's my opinion. I am proud of being a French-Canadian I am proud of our French-Canadian leaders, institutions. We must conserve French-Canadian culture and traditions. Agreed. But one should be worthy of preserving them, one should prove oneself honest and competent enough in all domains to merit the respect of the other part of the population that one calls wrongly, I believe, English Canadians in opposition to French-Canadians. In my opinion, that shouldn't exist at all, we should all be (called) Canadians. On one point alone should the distinction be made: English-speaking versus French-speaking but first and foremost, we should be called Canadians. That's my view of nationalism."

In contrast to "T", "U" attempted to deemphasize the role which these differences of nationality played. "If it were so, why would we, French-Canadian deputies from Quebec, have remained with Thompson?" But in doing so, he pointed up a more subtle difference, which is far more significant: "I never sensed any friction in the party between English and French Canadians,



there were differences of opinion, different attitudes of mind (mentalités)." And he also made clear where he stood on these matters: "Caouette was reproached for speaking too much about the French fact in the House. I told him personally not to speak about the inscription on the caps of bus drivers, since this wouldn't produce the solution between French and English Canada. I told him to treat more serious, more profound themes."

"S" showed a similar kind of impatience with this "nationalism" of a trivial sort. Of the use of French in caucus he commented, "There was never, never, emphatically never any question of (curbing) French in the caucus, never. When Caouette says that Thompson was annoyed about having French (spoken) there, he (Thompson) never said that, never, never, never. Now Thompson did say often: 'If you spend your time demanding (the use of) French, the people are going to turn against you'. That he said, for example. But he never said: 'Stop speaking French'. At first, we spoke all the time in French. Then there was confusion (broue). But he didn't say more than that. And he emphasized his own role in curbing these extremes of nationalism. If there was anyone who insisted on (limiting such interventions on behalf of French), it was I, because I was often embarrassed to hear these fellows put certain questions in the House ... in my function as whip, everyone who wished to ask questions showed me them in advance ... Now I had many questions put, but when a fellow came and said 'listen, in bulletin No. 36385 of the Ministry of Lands and Forests nothing is written





in French, it should be written bilingually<sup>1</sup>, how could that have been done? It was clear that they weren't right ... I was ashamed of being a French Canadian; I escaped outside, I went to smoke a cigarette, I smoked away the time..."

The "new" Cr ditistes, then, for the most part tended to play down their nationalism. They also seemed to identify the nationalism displayed by some of their colleagues with a kind of immaturity. In particular, nationalism which manifested itself in complaints about use of French was seen as an involvement with symptoms which were superficial. The behaviour of a Bernard Dumont in refusing to make his intervention on behalf of eastern Quebec in accordance with accepted standards of parliamentary procedure reflected a related kind of nationalistic immaturity. Gilles Gr goire's demand that Beauchesne be translated into French was of the same order.

The "old" Cr ditistes, on the other hand, were quite proud of what they regarded as their substantial achievements in this area. R al Caouette boasted of the change which his group had brought about in the use of French in parliamentary restaurants and on menus. He stressed the importance of the Beauchesne incident,<sup>1</sup> as well as the pension plan translation incident<sup>2</sup> in awakening English Canada to the French Canadian

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<sup>1</sup> Convention speech, Granby, 1963.

<sup>2</sup> Convention speech, Quebec City, March, 1965.



demand for equal rights. Gilles Grégoire listed his questioning of Messrs. Gordon and MacGregor in committee concerning their language policies as his prime achievement. "We were the first to state clearly and strongly what we want, and we opened the eyes of lots of people."

It is difficult to assess the effect of these interventions on behalf of the French language and nationality among Quebec voters in general. But it is certain that, as Dr. Marcoux himself admitted, the nationalism and nationality of Caouette won many supporters to his side during the split who might otherwise have hesitated to follow him. The attitude of one "old" Cr ditiste who did not like Caouette personally may be taken as typical: "In the first assembly which M. C  t   convoked after the split, when he remained with Thompson, I was the first to disassociate myself from him. M. C  t   was one of my great friends, I had worked hard for him... But I stayed with Caouette ... Caouette had worked enormously hard. Apart from that, he was a French Canadian..."

## 2) Quebec versus the rest of Canada

While nationalism is often translated into demands for a special status for the province of Quebec vis-  -vis the rest of Canada, the two should not be treated as equivalents. Caouette's attitude on this latter question, as opposed to his attitude on the former, is a case in point. He seems much more concerned with maintaining the integrity of Canada as a nation than are





most strong French-Canadian nationalists. When asked to explain why he adopted this attitude and why he seemed to differ from "C" in this respect, he attempted to justify it in the following way: "When I was at college, we had quite a large group of English-speaking students, not only Canadians, but youngsters from the United States in the Fall River District of Massachusetts. Our college was absolutely bilingual. Then I had to get to know them. Now I am a French-Canadian nationalist, I definitely am one, but not to the detriment of others. Others, like "C", are less inclined to understand that because they hadn't any prior relationship with the English population. Many of them were taught to regard the English as "les maudits Anglais" for years and years. They accepted the argument 'If you are not advancing, it is because the English are preventing you from advancing'. I am convinced that it is not so." His outlook on the future on Confederation flows from the preceding belief: "This is what I say: it is possible to save Confederation if we lay the blame where it ought to lay. It is our own politicians who have been playing politics instead of serving their own people. They have been playing the patronage game and greasing road contracts and doing things of that nature to the detriment of the people, taxing them to the bone and doing nothing, except organizing for elections and amassing an election fund. That's all they think about. Now this is our own fault, not that of Ontario's. No English Canadian has ever stopped me from earning my own living. I deal with the English-speaking people at Chrysler Corporation. They are fine



people. I get along with them." Caouette also was explicit on where he stands on the question of separatism: "When they say Caouette is a separatist; I am the least separatist in Quebec."

On the other hand, Caouette does support the demands for increasing autonomy for the province. "Some deal will have to be concluded because the Canadian Constitution will have to be adapted to 1964 rather than for 1867. Other provinces need more autonomy as well. We have to fight for the four points (adopted at the January Convention: exclusive provincial control of currency and banking, trade, tariffs on imports and exports, control of immigration) not only for Quebec, but for all the other provinces as well, so that there will be decentralized administration. Let the provinces direct their own expansion by themselves. That is the only point we are emphasizing." Nor does he subscribe to a theory of "continued federation above all else": "If these demands are not granted, it will not be Quebec's fault that Confederation will end, but there will be an end somewhere". Thus, when quoted as saying "Bang, we will leave Confederation", Caouette admitted that "I meant exactly that ... It is a matter of nationalist ideals, of general policy for our province". Does Caouette perceive Quebec to be a province different from the others, then? It would seem so. "Everyone agrees that the culture in Quebec is different from that of other provinces ... but I am convinced that the two cultures can cooperate together in a parallel way..."





Now a number of the preceding attitudes may merely have been stated to uphold and pay lip service to political strategy adopted for the party at recent conventions. Caouette's constitutional position appears to have evolved to fit demands both in his own province and within his own party. It is possible that Caouette does not really care whether Quebec remains in or leaves Confederation. But certain evidence supports the hypothesis that it is he, above all, who has bridled potential separatism within the party. The precise reason for this is somewhat obscure. Apart from political opportunism and tactics, there is the possibility that his own particular beliefs may have determined his position on the question.

The other leading members of the "old" group of Cr ditistes generally adopted a similar, though in tone more strident, position on Quebec's place within Confederation. "C" was asked if he was not inclined slightly more to separatism than Mr. Caouette. He hesitated at first, and then replied "No ... uh .. no. First of all, one of the principles of Social Credit is decentralization. Following Douglas in his writings, you must decentralize and bring the administration closer to the people. I have confidence in Confederation, but I am a fervent advocate of amending the constitution."

He continued: "A paper written in 1867 can no longer do the job for us in 1967. That doesn't mean that we must separate. In 1867 our fathers separated certain things, for example education, justice. There are perhaps other aspects to readjust,



and I say that that whatever happens, should apply not only to Quebec, but to the people of other provinces as well."

"C" went on to define more precisely the arrangement he envisaged as more ideal: "This (having a minister of Agriculture in Ottawa) is not at all within the spirit of Confederation. There are some things that we must do together: defence, currency for example. Today we are not at all in the spirit of 1867. You have a minister of roads here in Ottawa when roads are exclusively in the provincial domain. Why one in Ottawa then?... I say this frankly and not only for the province of Quebec, although it applies to Quebec more because Quebec represents the French element in more than one province. Ottawa must return to the spirit of Confederation, or else it (Confederation) will begin to dissolve. British Columbia supports this position, even Ontario does." "B" drew an analogy with the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States in order to illustrate his concept of Quebec in Confederation. "The comparison was only on one point. My point of comparison was that Puerto Rico is paying no tax to Washington, no direct or indirect tax. They are together, they are American citizens, but yet they don't pay taxes to Washington. They pay taxes to their own government in San Juan, Puerto Rico, so they can administer themselves. They have control of all the sources of revenue... Puerto Rico has its own taxes and spends its own money, and yet it can live in harmony with Americans because each one is minding its own business."





In other words, the leaders of the Ralliement advocate what amounts to a form of associate statehood for Quebec, in which the province would have exclusive jurisdiction over all of the important economic fields. It would have exclusive control over direct and indirect sources of revenues. It would collect its own taxes. It would control its own banks. Many people have labelled "associate statehood" a giant step towards the ultimate breakup of Confederation. Are the Cr ditistes aware of these possible consequences? Apparently not, judging from Mr. Caouette's reaction.

"What would Ontario care about Quebec's controlling its own credit, for instance? About allowing us to develop according to our capacity? Who would object to it? Nobody. Then why, aren't we doing it instead of permitting Quebec to come begging to Ottawa for tax benefits and reorganization of the fiscal structure ... One after the other, federal-provincial conferences have been nil, fiascos (Caouette)."

If they are aware of the conflict potential, however, they are nevertheless driven to adopt this extreme position regardless, and largely because of internal pressure within their party, their own sense of nationalism, and the electoral potential in this plank. "It stems from our background as nationalists in the Province of Quebec. We are the majority in our province. We do not want to be called a minority in the whole of Canada". (Caouette). And there is also the force and logical consistency which it lends to arguments for applying Social Credit



doctrine at the provincial level. If Quebec had exclusive jurisdiction over banking, credit and economic resources, it could constitutionally apply Social Credit monetary theory in the form of provincial legislation. Presumably for a Cr ditiste Party it would be much easier to capture control of the provincial government than to win power in Ottawa. Why, then, does Mr. Caouette not immediately opt for separatism? "I have always had the conviction, which I may change, since only fools do not change, that there is a possible way of convincing Ottawa that the provinces should have more power, more liberty, more freedom, and more control over their economy". (Caouette)

How do the "new" Cr ditistes feel about such issues? According to "S", "I don't accept going from one extreme to another. I am for a solution of the middle way. Only when this proves impossible should we then go to an extreme. For example, in Confederation, I am in favour of asking for all that we are entitled to have. We must then give time to the rest of the country to permit them to either accept or reject what we are entitled to have. If they don't want to understand, then that's too bad. Then we must go to the extreme. But only after we have failed to find a middle way". "T's" extreme moderation with respect to nationalism translates itself into a moderate position on Quebec's status vis- -vis the rest of Canada. "U's" stance on these matters is likewise flexible. Other sympathizers with this "new" group expressed opinions of a similar nature and tone. "W" stated "They (the "old" Cr ditistes) have a fundamentally nationalist tendency. And





on this point I approve of their views. I approve of their being nationalist. First of all, they are French Canadians, but not to the detriment of other provinces. It's not necessary to 'cut it clean'... I'm not a separatist. I have confidence in the other provinces, who are like good neighbours. It is necessary to act in concert to develop the country." Asked if he thought that the Ralliement had become too nationalist, the same person answered, "From a provincial point of view, no. I don't think so because they have done an enormous amount of good in Ottawa. They have awakened the English element... I admire their nationalism, but it isn't necessary to abuse it, or to refuse to deal with the English, the English-Canadians. I was the national delegate on the Social Credit Council. When it concerned dealing with the English, they were too anxious, how can I put it, to 'cut it clean'. I was the only French-Canadian who remained at the conference table... Caouette, Legault and Gilles Grégoire left the room, and I stayed, the only one, to discuss the matter further. I didn't agree with the English. But it was necessary to stay there with them in order to speak to them: it's not by going away, by fleeing, that we are going to make them understand."... And yet, he appeared to be just as extreme in what he was demanding from a constitutional and economic point of view. "It's necessary to remake Confederation if we want the two races to be treated on an equal footing, and the province of Quebec to be treated as masters of our own destiny, masters of our institutions. ... I would like very much to see that the revision of the Constitution



be no more and no less than an associate state, the formula of an associate state. I am in favour of an associate state."

In other words, the "new" Cr ditistes are generally just as extreme in what they demand for Quebec, but they are far more moderate about the way in which they feel the negotiations should be conducted and the demands should be presented.

The activist members of the Ralliement seemed in general to approve of both Mr. Caouette's position and his tactics on these matters. According to one organizer from Rouyn, "Even if the Ralliement entered provincial politics in Quebec, I think it would produce even more results than it did in Ottawa. I was a bit afraid that after the elections, the members would veer a bit towards separatism. In fact, there were several who were ready to support separatism. But they were Cr ditistes first. Separation had never yielded anything. It brings about a separation, that's all. On the contrary, all people who divide don't help each other. I think all the Cr ditistes understand this point. At least 75% of our Cr ditistes who are a little familiar with Social Credit will not opt for separatism". The same person, however, admitted that "Federal politics no longer interest me much. I am being frank. It's not because I dislike the federal government, or because I dislike the English, no. (It's because) the government closest to us is the one we should concern ourselves with. In Quebec, it's time we concerned ourselves with the provincial government". On the nature of a revised Constitution, and whether he





advocated an associate state, he replied, "I would prefer to see Canada in a confederation of 6 states: The Maritimes, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairies, British Columbia, and the north-east ... Ottawa would become like a kind of United Nations." And when asked whether these states would have power over immigration, monetary policy, etc., he replied "Yes" and went on to explain how a decentralized immigration policy could regulate a problem such as that of the negroes in the United States. Another organizer from Chicoutimi argued "I would prefer that we concentrate our efforts in Quebec rather than waste our time in Ottawa. I prefer a Quebec movement much more because in my opinion it is almost impossible to take power in Ottawa. Whereas in Quebec, it's possible: Because, although I am not a separatist, I believe that it's going to be necessary to get away from there. (Ottawa)." And further on he elaborated, "In my opinion, the provinces are not able to change the economic system: that has to come from the central government. I consider the Ralliement to have a fine policy. Quebec demands of the federal government that it give the right to the provinces to establish their own economic system. If Ottawa gives them that right, they will then be able to organize their economic system as they wish. If Ottawa refuses, then that will be the time to say: Quebec must separate from Confederation. In separating, it will have the right to run its own economic system. It's the only way."



How did westerners respond to these nationalist and constitutional revisionist views? Mr. Thompson's attitude may be taken as representative. First with respect to the nationalism of his former Social Credit Quebec colleagues as it affected their demands for wider use of French in the federal government, and other matters, he recalled, "There was no real friction (between Mr. Caouette and myself) except in the House of Commons. This continual harping on the French language and on every problem in the light of Quebec instead of in the light of the whole nation was something I just wouldn't tolerate. Consequently, I found myself having to exert control over it. I suppose friction dated from them. There was a general refusal to go along with the basic policy of talking in a sensible way, and I found myself constantly having to go on the defensive for Mr. Caouette. This is where the problem began. And further on, "Everything that they said in the House was based on Quebec problems. My first problem with Caouette arose when I told him that we had to look at problems in the light of the national situation. They had no provincial spokesman. They always came back to their provincial gripes. This harping about using French even on menus, and altering R.C.M.P. shoulder badges so as to have French on one side and English on the other. These things were just drawing scorn, even from their fellow Frenchmen, or fellow Quebeckers I should say, not to mention English-speaking Canadians." Mr. Thompson also intimated where he stands on the question of separatism and provincial rights, "I admit that there was a good element (in these demands), but this kind of thing has





also led to separatist demands too.... The Quebeckers had a gripe that someone had to bear for them. But there is more to Canada than just Quebec. They are members in a federal government, and therefore, have their responsibilities."

It is clear, then, that Mr. Thompson was rather impatient with the whole strategy of playing up French-Canadian grievances. What the supporters of the Cr ditistes regarded as their magnificent work in awakening English Canadians to the grievances of Quebec was seen by him as "a tendency to look at problems from the light of Quebec rather than from that of all Canada". There is little doubt that Mr. Thompson shared in large part the concept of "one Canada" which has been found to be so pervasive in western English-speaking Canada.

This is not to say, of course, that Mr. Thompson is in any sense "anti-French Canadian". He undoubtedly made every effort to understand and sympathize with the outlook of his Cr ditiste colleagues. And he was determined to be extra fair to them in order to avoid being labelled "anti-French Canadian". His own words on this are a fairly good indicator: "One of the reasons that I never took the initiative to break with them, because I should have, was simply that I did not want to be accused of being anti-Quebec. And I think that there isn't anyone in Canada who is more kindly concerning in his attitude towards Quebec because, having lived abroad (in Ethiopia), I know their problems very readily, and in perspective, which another person living in another part of Canada just cannot



really understand". And later, explaining his hesitation in forcing the split after the "affair of the six" and ensuing events in April, 1963, Mr. Thompson added "I should have taken the lead in forcing the split because I don't think we should ever have accepted four (of the six) back again.... I didn't because I didn't want to cause another split between French Canada and the rest of Canada."

3) Créditiste perception of western Social Crediters' similarities and differences

The differences which the Cr ditistes perceived in their western colleagues likewise varied largely in terms of whether they belonged to the Caouette group ("les vieux") or the Thompson group ("les nouveaux") and whether they were in close contact or remote from them. The kind of image they had undoubtedly influenced their decision to join one or the other of the two groups at the time of the split. Likewise, their decision, once taken, affected the image they had. This of course makes it difficult to assess just what kind of role such images had in the split. Nevertheless, we can assume that the images articulated a year or two after the split were not very different from those that were held before.

It is clear that Caouette himself considered Albertan Social Crediters to be conservatives rather than Social Crediters. He recognized, of course, that they had been the pathbreakers in introducing Social Credit to Canada. But he was convinced that, having long ago been bought by financiers and big business in Alberta, they no longer cared about Social Credit. The





worst offender in this regard was Premier Manning. For him, Manning was anti-French-Canadian. He had told Caouette "right in black and white that the West would never accept a French-Canadian Catholic as national Social Credit leader." Manning was, moreover, the real power behind the national Social Credit Association. From the very first he had pushed Thompson for the party leadership. This was because Manning himself hoped to become Primer Minister of Canada. "Manning was pushing for Thompson because Thompson was pressuring Manning to resign his premiership of Alberta and become the national leader of the Social Credit national movement. There was an understanding between the two that if Thompson had succeeded at the polls, then Manning would have resigned as Premier of Alberta to become the Prime Minister of Canada. I objected to it right then. I said the man who cannot face the difficulties of an election campaign when it's time to face them, shall never be the Prime Minister of Canada. So I objected to it." Manning had been responsible for getting Thompson to overthrow the Diefenbaker Government in 1963. "All of a sudden, because Thompson had received orders from Manning they decided to overthrow the Conservative Government." Thompson was "the puppet of Manning". And Manning was himself the puppet of the United States businessmen. "Manning is directly controlled by the United States, I am convinced of it. He received an order from somebody in the United States to push Thompson..." It was Manning who had refused to allow the national association to give money to Quebec. Manning had refused to permit a larger representation to Quebec on the National Council and executive.



Caouette's image of western Social Credit was that it was different, largely because Manning had made it different. It was a monolithic image of Alberta and National Social Credit, dominated by a personal antipathy to Manning.

On the other hand, Caouette was profuse in his praises of what Social Credit governments had accomplished in both western provinces in terms of good administration. He constantly cited figures to show the much lower provincial debt of Alberta and British Columbia. Bennett's demands for a provincial bank won his accolades. He probably had a good image of Bennett personally. Or at least, he was grateful for Bennett's campaign support. For that reason, he did not talk in a derogatory manner about Bennett as a Social Crediter. He generally avoided bringing him in altogether in articulating his grievances towards the West.

"C" had a cloudier vision of these people. He had had much less contact with them. His attitudes were, as Thompson observed, much more provincial. He had met Thompson in early 1961 and had rather liked him, but he had not been able to change his image of the man as basically "English-Protestant". He was less concerned with what he thought of westerners or they of him, and cared more about his own position within the Ralliement. Insofar as they comprised a threat to his position within the movement that he had created to a large extent himself, he was hostile to them. Apart from that, he did not care about them one way or another. His immediate concern for Social Credit was in Quebec, rather than in all of Canada.





"B" understood Thompson very well. But he considered him a weak leader. He also recognized a certain naiveté in Thompson on the question of French-English relations, which he exploited to the full. "We had some difficulties understanding each other, especially in problems of bilingualism and biculturalism". The issue was "B's" bread and butter. He was not to be impeded from pressing forth in this area by Thompson.

All three, then, were inclined to walk out on the western contingent at first provocation after the 1963 election. They used the pretext of being under-represented at the National Council to do so.

The "new" Créditistes articulated much more charitable images of their western confreres. All of them showed respect and sometimes admiration for Mr. Thompson. "S", on being directly questioned, had the most precise image of the other leading member particularly in terms of doctrinal orthodoxy: "It's necessary to make distinctions. First of all, between Social Credit at the provincial and at the national level. Bennett is not a Social Crediter, and doesn't believe in it at all... Manning is an orthodox Social Crediter, who knows how to apply it but he is a practical man... On the federal side, the British Columbian M.P.'s are even more orthodox than the Albertans. Patterson and Leboe were elected in 1954, and feel under the tutelage of Blackmore and Solon Low. They are ministers or strong religious believers. They were receptive to the doctrine. Bennett is very far from them in personality".



"T" described the westerners as "more mature than most of our deputies. This he attributed to their having been deputies before. They also seemed more realistic in their application of Social Credit principles than the members from Quebec. He was, however, less charitable to Premier Manning. "Manning was never highly esteemed in the Quebec Social Credit group. It is known that Manning himself has certain prejudices which are not in our favour, and consequently, there is a kind of animosity or at least of mutual incomprehension, which has not yet been broken, even with those of us who had closer relations with Manning." Of Bennett he speculated, "I understand Bennett a little also, because Bennett and Caouette are in my opinion fellows of about the same caliber. They are personalities with many points in common."

"U" shared a similar image of the western deputies as in some sense more responsible and able. "Social Credit in the west is a party in power, strong, serious, established in the ways of the people. It's very important for them that they should not be dishonoured and ridiculed; all the Social Credit leaders in the west are serious men, whereas in Quebec, the party has always had a bad image, of being unacceptable in professional milieux, of being bourgeois, uneducated, parading with berets and flags. The mentality of a Cr ditiste trained by Gilberte is not at all like that of a Social Crediter trained by Manning. It is permissible to be rich in the West and also a Social Crediter, whereas for Caouette it is unthinkable to be both rich and a Cr ditiste." Thus discussion was very





difficult between the groups. And the split came as a welcome event. "I think they had a profound dislike for Caouette. They above all wanted to remove him from his position as deputy leader. His declarations did them much harm in the West. They sought every means not to be identified with Caouette any longer... They were relieved that Caouette decided to split from the party."

Why, then, had they agreed to the union in the first place? "The west hoped to see the possibility of a national victory." And why hadn't they pressed for the split after the April election? According to "S", they were concerned to maintain the unity of the party, lest they jeopardize their own chances for reelection. The two accounts are inconsistent. Perhaps internally they were glad to be rid of Caouette. But pragmatically they worked to keep him in.

The image of the westerners was shared by a number of Creditistes in Caouette's own group. One member, who had translated Thompson's book from English to French, spoke admiringly of his capacity. Of Manning, however, he disapprovingly remarked, "There was a lack of dialogue. You French-Canadians you must understand once and for all that you are only one province in ten." Another, who had served as M.P. in 1962-63, was asked to explain the difference between Social Credit of the west and that in the province of Quebec. His reply was that "The base is almost the same. Except it is understood differently by an English-speaking person. An English person



does not engage in politics in the same way as a French-Canadian. I think there is a little difference there. The Englishman is more of an administrator, who doesn't become angry, who works always to attain his goal quietly. The French-Canadian is not as flexible a fellow."

And yet, there were some, particularly among the more parochial activists, who accepted this kind of argument: "The English provinces are stuffed to the brim with money, whereas we are starving of hunger. Thus in the business of the west, the people have been stuffed by the old parties, when we here are dying of hunger." (L). This kind of image would certainly have influenced the rank and file member to join with Caouette rather than Thompson. But it probably reflected the opinion of only a small minority of Cr ditiste members.

The attitude of the majority of the rank-and-file Cr ditistes towards the westerners probably lay somewhere in between. The western Social Crediters were too remote to be familiar to them or of much concern. On the other hand, there was a general appreciation that they were on the whole not very different from Cr ditistes. They held similar reformist ideas. They were opposed to the traditional political institutions and methods. And they were more or less anxious to implement Social Credit.





f) The second dimension of Cr ditiste Culture:

Identification with one's fellow citizens.

Verba's second category, identification with one's fellow citizens, has been interpreted within the Cr ditiste context to refer to each member's sense of solidarity with or sense of difference from the other members in his party. It has been subdivided into two major categories: (1) class differences, in particular, attitudes towards "professionals" within the party, and (2) sense of Cr ditiste, and especially "berets blancs", camaraderie. These appeared to be the major focal points of solidarity and cleavage within the Quebec party, and hence were major factors in the split.

(1) Class differences: Superiority-inferiority feelings in terms of social class appeared to have seriously undermined Cr ditiste solidarity in the period 1960-63. The "old" Cr ditistes had deliberately wooed the more respectable people-professionals, civic leaders and the like - in order to improve their image to the voter. And yet they seem to have been unable to get over a profound sense of inferiority towards these better educated, and generally more independent-minded individuals of higher status. The latter did not attempt to conceal their disdain for many of the "old" Cr ditistes who lacked education, a capacity for speech and reflection, an image of respectability. Conflict between the two groups was therefore inevitable.

R al Caouette himself, although the prime mover behind the "image-uplifting operation", was never able to overcome his



own distrust and envy of professionals. He was in all respects a man of the common folk, who made no attempt to hide his feelings of identification with these "average" people. In this sense he was faithful to the training inculcated by Gilberte Côté-Mercier, who, though university-educated, always stressed the need for solidarity with the poor and downtrodden-- a kind of Christian asceticism temporally defined.

Caouette articulated his deliberate effort to reach the common folk. He was prone to use "direct explanations that touch them right in their own home, in their own heart, and that was the point." (Caouette). He himself had come from a poor background. "I was born in a very small house, 12 by 18. My father was a settler and he was sick for four or five years. My mother had to look after 5 children at that time. Eventually my father got a job from the provincial government at a very low salary. He received \$90 a month. We were 8 children." Yet he had managed to graduate from a classical college during the depression years, where many others were denied the opportunity. "I know what misery is. I've seen it, I've lived with it. While I was going to school, I had friends who would have liked to come to college with me in the years 1932 to 1936. They couldn't come. I couldn't understand why all the colleges were half full. Priests and brothers would come during vacation time to all parts of the Province of Quebec looking for students, and they couldn't find any because there was no money and their institutions were at fault." After graduating, he had entered business, first as an employee of the Bank of Commerce, later as a





travelling salesman. He has been in business ever since.

It is possible that Caouette has been frustrated by his non-professional status ever since he left the classical college. At any rate, it is clear that he has a marked admiration for professional people. When he referred to professionals within his own party, he generally added a word of identification. François Even was a "lawyer, I know him personally" (Even was one of the 11 co-founders of the movement). Gérard Girouard was "this young lawyer whom I thought would be an asset to the movement". Dr. Marcoux, as a general practitioner from a well-known Quebec City family was strongly pressured by him to join the Créditistes and run for office. "I suggested Marcoux myself." Gérard Chapdelaine had just passed his bar examination and established a law practice in Sherbrooke when Caouette had been informed of his Créditiste sympathies. He immediately went all out to persuade him to run as a candidate. Caouette's relationship with Gilles Grégoire may be partly explained by his respect both for Grégoire's father, who was a lawyer and professor, and for Gilles' own university and legal training.

But he shows a clear ambivalence in this respect. He does not trust professionals and is receptive to general attacks and accusations made against them. Thus, he associated Girouard's party disloyalty with the fact of his being a lawyer, when the two might not have been related at all. Dr. Marcoux's challenge to his leadership was considered to stem in large part from his higher status, resulting from his profession. Most important,



Caouette was ready to believe the accusations made by Gérard Perron and Gilbert Rondeau against the professionals in the party, without requiring corroborative evidence.

"B" seemed to share Caouette's high esteem for the professional. Obviously he capitalized on his own qualifications in this respect. He saw his own role in the Ralliement as that of the trained lawyer. "My role is simple. In the group I am the only one who studied law and procedures in the House. It is important to have some knowledge of the law or to have some kind of background like that, and I am the only one who so qualifies, so I act as House leader." He also tried to pose as a well-educated, intellectually well-rounded person. "I took my B.A. at the Jesuit's College in Quebec City, and then I attended the University (Laval) in the faculty of Philosophy, where I took my diploma in philosophy, and then I studied law, and received my license in law." "For four years I was president of the artistic association of Laval University whose purpose was to present concerts for students. My main hobby was always music, classical music, especially Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Brahms. I also like very much listening to chamber music. I can do that for evenings and evenings." And further on, "I read a lot of books on politics and economics. I also liked paintings of mansions, paintings like those on the wall here. If you see this one with the Parliament Buildings, it is one of the best..." And again, "I read lots of books on philosophy, on economics, drama, theater, especially Greek history and Greek authors. I have read many of them and even translated





some of them from Greek to French." Moreover, "B's" father, was a graduate lawyer, a professor in law and economics at Laval University, and a man of some standing in the community (he was mayor of Quebec City for a time). "B" therefore, probably encouraged Caouette in his efforts to attract professionals into the party. On the other hand, he might have preferred that they did not become overly powerful. He had his own reputation to guard in this respect -- he was the professional, though of a somewhat dubious standing. His reputation was somewhat tarnished by the fact that he had never passed his bar examination, and by his rather notorious appetite for women and drink.<sup>1</sup> "B's" postures of intellectualism and professionalism appeared to be largely incidental to his own complete absorption in the "game" of politics and its allied benefits.

"C" disliked the professionals because they threatened his leadership within the party and because they reminded him of some of his own inadequacies. They were sensitive to his limited education and colloquial speech. In 1961 they had tried to oppose his candidacy for the provincial presidency by putting up a candidate of their own -- Roland Bertrand, a Grondines accountant. They accused him of being too provincial, too coarse in his language and grammar, too "gilbertiste" in his manner of organization and in his attitudes. The movement

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<sup>1</sup> From a number of reliable informers.



failed to gain any momentum, Bertrand declined to run, and "C" was elected President unanimously. But it left him with an understandable distrust of the "professionals" whom he identified as "les nouveaux" or "les modernistes": the Marcoux, Girouards, and Chapdelaines of the party.

The "professionals" themselves appeared to do little to mitigate the conflict over status, class and community esteem. "S" showed a clear sense of class superiority over Caouette which he must not have concealed at the time of their partnership: "I used to go to the hospital every day (at the time that Caouette began his T.V. broadcasts in the Quebec City area). I met doctors who said to me: "Did you hear Caouette? What do you think? He says some things that are true. What do you think of Social Credit? ... Little by little these people said: There must be some good sense in it. We are going to take it more seriously than we did. Evidently, a garageman (garagiste), an automobile salesman who begins to speak on television, the people don't always have much confidence in him." And in writing to Caouette in those early days, "I told him that his operation was not so stupid and that even if it was simple in appearance, it was simply because the problem was not as complicated as the people wanted it to be. There were even many professionals whom I knew who were beginning to believe that it could have some good sense in it." Later, on his joining, "I thought that they were all honest, sincere men. It's true that a group can purify politics. And, given that these are all middle class people, that there are no professionals who form part of the





group, it's clear that if I joined I would give them a big lift."

"T" showed a skepticism about the capacity of Cr ditistes to cope with economics, feeling that this was in the domain of professional economists: "That's the reason that I think the Cr ditistes, the berets blancs, pretend to give lessons in political economy to the classical economists, and, for that matter, to anyone. They are out of their element. They lack the foundation of a general education capable of permitting them to assimilate this material, which in fact is complicated. Speak to any economist and he will admit himself that the monetary system is very complicated; but for these others it's not complicated, it's simple, simple. It's even too simple."

"U" admitted, "One of the factors which encouraged me to join Social Credit was that I wanted to prove that it wasn't a thing purely for illiterates, that it could include people with university education who are interested and who believe in 20th century formulas. It's also perhaps the fact that I considered my father to be a very intelligent man who believed certain things in Social Credit, and that influenced me to want to prove that there were not only illiterates in the movement." Elaborating, he reflected, "It's certain that the group of Cr ditistes who were educated in the mentality of Gilberte C t -Mercier thought that all those who didn't belong to the middle class, especially someone who is professional, are dangerous and incapable of understanding the true feelings of the people. It's a bit of this mentality that I found among



the people that I knew in the Ralliement." And finally, "There was definitely a fear of professionals and as a result the communication and exchange of ideas was very difficult; everything that one (a professional) might say was received with suspicion." And yet "U" himself obviously provoked these feelings. "When discussion became too infantile or illogical, I withdrew from it."

Other activists of both wings shared this general view of the class basis of the party, although they interpreted it in different ways. An alderman, a successful storeowner, and from Lauzon, who stayed with Caouette, admitted that "on joining the Ralliement, I met much opposition from public-minded men who came to see me, to discourage me...some even said to me that they couldn't understand how an intelligent and successful man like myself could join Social Credit." And he showed a certain impatience with the quality of men who ran as candidates, "We cannot always bring before the people a perfect imbecile, who has an opportunity to be nominated because he has built up a little organization." But his egalitarian beliefs about classes moderated the normal feelings of class superiority that he might otherwise have felt: "I believe that the only party that can solve our problems is Social Credit. Because you have in that party a number of fellows who have seen what misery really is. They attack it at the foundation. If I built a house today, I would begin with the frame and four posts and then add the foundation and the wall. I am beginning with my foundation. The foundation is the agricultural and then the





working class. Give these two classes the advantage of living in ease, and then the rest of society, the businessmen, doctors, insurance brokers, everybody would prosper, if these two classes could (prosper). Unfortunately it's the opposite today." He continued "I don't estimate the intelligence of a person by his training (instruction), I judge it by his natural intelligence. After, one gives him training to develop that intelligence." Another prosperous member, an accountant, who wavered in his loyalty, explained "Caouette, Legault...they are men who gave much of themselves, but they made errors...there was lacking in the movement a few of the elite...the elite of society, none of them were in the movement. They're all 'poor devils', it's all right for them to know how to read and write, all that it required of them was their time. When it is matter of coming to study problems, of understanding problems, of launching and building an organization, that's another matter, that takes competent men, who have education and training." "W" when asked why it was that professionals like himself didn't join the Ralliement, proffered, "There is a very profound reason for that. People who have a place (sont en place), who have a good position, the businessman, the professional, he succeeds, he has a good standard of living, he is obliged to conduct public business, then he must follow the current, he must pay attention not to utter statements that can be turned against him. Now, at that moment, in a new venture these people, they don't even take the trouble to think about whether it will be good for their neighbour, for the general condition... The poor man, he



suffers, and thus he sees the need to think, to act. The educated class, the prosperous class, they are not concerned."

The split between Caouette and Thompson undoubtedly alienated a substantial number of sympathetic professionals and businessmen. Some left the party altogether. Others became inactive though nominally still members. Even those who remained active were not entirely satisfied with the state of class representation in the movement. They tried to rationalize it in different ways. "I noticed one thing in Alberta, the year that they won power, in 1935, there wasn't a single professional in the party. Personally, I believe that the problem with politics at present is that there are too many professionals in it. Going back 20 years, to my father's time, he who could become a professional was someone with money. Those professionals never knew what it was to earn a dollar... Them, because Mr. so and so had a diploma he was recognized as "monsieur", but what did he know about administration? I say that the professional is one of the worst administrators because he has never administered." (G) But most of them still shared the uneasy feeling of one old-time Cr ditiste, who complained, "I think that Social Credit has the best policies in the world, but it doesn't have the men to promote them. We lack men who win confidence, who are popular...I know friends who have never voted for Social Credit, but would have liked to, except they told us, 'We would certainly be with Social Credit, but you don't have men...' In the movement there isn't one professional; there was one, Dr. Marcoux. One could say that





there is a fear of having professionals in our movement. The professional class, whether one likes it or not, has influence in the population."

(2) Créditiste camaraderie: Acting parallel with and reinforcing this sense of class difference was a strong sense of loyalty to old friends and associations dating back to Union des Electeurs times. The "berets blancs" were much more than an association meeting for purely political purposes. They were a kind of large "family", a province-wide social organization whose members met many times informally although formally only once a year. They drunk and ate together, travelled together, shared stories together, suffered the same hardships together trying to "sell" Social Credit. Gilberte Coté-Mercier had tried to cultivate the idea that all the members were her "children", who had attended her "school", had been brought up by her, and were now assuming positions of importance within her fold. In fact, the second generation of Créditistes did grow up under her wing, only to turn against her and her kind of leadership. But they retained much of their initial camaraderie with each other. On the other hand, those who had not shared these earlier experiences were generally regarded as "outsiders". Even when a conscious effort was made to welcome them into the fold, the distinction between "old" and "new" members somehow remained a prominent psychological factor in the inter-relationships of Ralliement members.

Réal Caouette did not conceal the importance of this factor in his own thinking and actions. In his office are displayed



photographs of the four individuals in the Ralliement with whom he has had the longest unbroken association: Laurent Legault, Gilles Grégoire, Gilberte Rondeau and Gérard Perron, all of them, with the exception of Grégoire, former close associates of his in the Union des Electeurs. Grégoire was himself generally identified with the "berets blancs" because of the prominent role which his father played in the early development of the movement; he was, moreover, the one who first broached the idea to Caouette of forming a separate Créditiste movement. As Caouette himself put it, "Dr. Marcoux played behind my back all during the first session that we were here (in Ottawa). He conspired behind my back with Thompson because Grégoire was close to me, and Marcoux couldn't get along with Grégoire. I have a letter right here in my pocket, in which Marcoux stated how he felt about Grégoire, charging that Grégoire was not a Social Crediter, that he never knew Social Credit doctrine, that he only looked out for himself, and so on. Why Grégoire was a founder of the movement, and Marcoux was not!" And when asked if Legault, Grégoire and he formulate most of the policy for the Ralliement, he replied, "I would say so because we were the three real founders of the movement." During the affair of the six he blocked all attempts to expel from the movement the two major proponents of the pledge, Perron and Rondeau, on the grounds that they had been associated with Social Credit for a very long period. He acceded to the importunities of Perron and Rondeau and demanded that a new slate of M.P.'s be named to the Ralliement executive on the grounds that he could not work with the first group (including





Côté, Chapdelaine, Lessard --- all "new" Cr ditistes), but could work with the second (including Rondeau, Perron, Gr goire, and Langlois --- all "old" Cr ditistes). And yet he was somewhat defensive about his own policies in this regard. When asked about the accusation made by a Le Devoir reporter, Mario Cardinale, that he had deliberately selected the delegates to the Granby Convention in 1963 to include mostly former "berets blancs", he shot back, "Those statements were not from Cardinale himself, they were made to him by Dr. Marcoux. 'A bunch of berets blancs' -- I don't care about the berets blancs. I still have my 'white beret' at home, but I am not in their organization anymore. Cardinale was completely misinformed..."

"C" likewise tried to play down the factor of camaraderie. "There is no question of 'old' versus 'new' Cr ditistes. They are Cr ditistes, period." But he also made it apparent where his true feelings lay: "We are old Cr ditistes who founded the movement; we opened the door to all the new Cr ditistes." He was more willing to acknowledge his debt to the "berets blancs": "We can't separate the two movements entirely. They advocate the same Social Credit. Their principles continue to be the same. The only thing which distinguishes us from them is the means we advocate to obtain Social Credit."

Legault obviously takes much pride in his past work and associations in the Union des Electeurs. He keeps in storage old bound volumes and back issues of Vars Demain, pamphlets, leaflets, souvenirs and awards he accumulated during the years in which he was a member. Many of his closest friendships date



from this early period. He had served as a director on the Institute of Political Action, the governing body of the original movement, and was the organizer-in-chief of the 1948 provincial campaign, in which the berets blancs made their greatest campaign effort. After that campaign he had a falling-out with Mme Mercier and resigned from the directorate. But he never severed his connection completely from the movement, its doctrine, or the people, like Réal Caouette, with whom he was originally connected.

"B" was ostensibly most antagonistic to the Union des Electeurs. "I have never been with the movement of Gilberte Côté, the white berets. I have never been a partisan of that group ... I favoured the principles but was never able to accept the methods of the Union des Electeurs." That was not the way to conduct politics, explain ideas or a programme." And yet his father was one of the three leaders of the movement and its most distinguished member. "B" did not immediately mention this. "My father was mayor of Quebec City for five years, and he was a member of the provincial house in Quebec." - "Your father was a Créditiste?" - "Yes, he was, but I never wanted to be with them..." "B" himself was a member of the Young Liberal Association for Laval University, and made a few speeches for the party in the 1956 provincial election, in which Georges Lapalme formed an alliance with the "berets blancs" and other opposition groups. Two years later he helped form the Ralliement. His father was then still active in the Union. "How do you explain the fact that your father did not influence you to join the Créditistes in those early years?" - "It is





very difficult to influence me. Besides, he did not make me do something I did not like. I studied Social Credit though." Part of the explanation for this apparent hostility lies in his mother's antagonism to the Cr ditistes. The movement had enveloped his father, turned him from a respectable Liberal, a mayor, and a candidate for Duplessis' cabinet (as Action Lib rale Nationale M.P.) into an impotent leader of a hated (by traditional elites) sect. She would never allow any of her children to be so misled. "We were six children. My brothers and sisters do not involve themselves in politics, any of them. I am the only one". For "B" there was, then, a curious ambivalence towards the Cr ditistes created in large part by the strongly opposing attitudes of his two parents. He obviously knew many of the "berets blancs", who were often at his home. "I knew Cr ditistes like Caquette. ... I knew what Social Credit was and approved of it, but I would not be a member of the group with the white berets." The attraction to the party and its doctrine finally induced him to join -- but only as part of a new group. "I convinced Caquette to get out of the white berets and found a new party." As founding member, he was associated with, and closely attached to, the group of former "berets blancs" within the Ralliement -- those whom he had persuaded to break with Gilberte. Some may have resented his former aloofness or his rather curt manner. But he had the credentials, if not always the desire or the personality, to enjoy Cr ditiste camaraderie. And his sympathies lay there as well.



The reaction against this "in-group" cliquishness was strong among the new Cr ditistes. They suspected that the split between Caouette and Mme C t  was not entirely legitimate. "There was an incontestable difference between Caouette's group and the berets blancs .. and yet, they never denounced the militarism of Gilberte (marching in procession), they never renounced the principle of the Union des Electeurs that Louis Even had espoused of uniting electors into little sectors where they could have local study circles and where they could control everything through their small cells. They never rejected that. The only thing they renounced was that Gilberte, rather than devoting herself to political action, immersed herself in religious action. ... It's a strange phenomenon, these fellows who on the one hand let themselves be deeply influenced on the emotional plane, and ... on the other hand, were politicians who wanted to fight election campaigns. They revived the formula of Louis Even from the Union des Electeurs and they shunted aside the religious formula of Gilberte. They departed (sont partis dans) into political organization; they recruited their men from the ranks of (sur le plan) the Union des Electeurs. The whole organization, with a few exceptions, were men of the berets blancs , of Vers Demain." (S) Most of them did not like the "berets blancs" to begin with. "Their operation was ridiculous. First they presented it very badly. And then, this idea of mixing in prayers during public demonstrations, of singing hymns and all that, I found it completely out of place." (T) "I didn't believe in Social Credit, because it was too demagogic; I didn't like the attitude of Gilberte C t -





Mercier and Louis Even." (U). When they tried to introduce sweeping changes in organization and administration they faced the opposition of the old-time members. "It was very difficult to influence the thinking (ligne de pensée) of the party because they retained too many of the old clichés, that is, the men who were in the party for a number of years; they said it was their business to strengthen the party and we (the candidates and M.P.'s) shouldn't be allowed much say in the organization of the party..."

(U). When they tried to interject on points of policy, they were reminded of their inferior training in Social Credit doctrine. "There was a group of deputies who in several respects were my superiors. Above all, they were superior to me, from the point of view of Social Credit education. As for me, I was just a little novice, like someone who is at boarding school (fait du pensionnat); a little novice is a little novice, he often stays in the background (dans le coin). I was a novice simply because on the question of Social Credit (doctrine) I wasn't familiar with much of it, and I didn't dare to venture too far in this area. There were some who had worked together for 15 or 20 years, they had certainly formed close bonds with each other (noué des liens), and moreover, nourished ambitions..."

(T). The gap between the two groups widened as the months passed. "There was definitely a separation created in the caucus. It was the manner of expressing one's point of view that made for division. When one would speak of the dividend, of people of a "beret blanc" cast of mind, of 'beretblancomania', in the caucus, immediately, there was a division..." (U). It is not surprising, then, that when



Caouette and Grégoire sided with Perron and Rondeau and shielded them from sanctions, the "new" Cr ditistes felt a sense of alienation, of being unable to direct the party along the lines they believed were best.

It was natural for them to turn to Robert Thompson. He shared their attitudes to a great extent, both on class superiority and on Cr ditiste camaraderie: In his own words, "It was the characteristic of Caouette, and particularly of Legault, to be suspicious of new people... When the split came, as far as Caouette and myself are concerned, it was the old berets blancs people who stayed with them and it was the new people, most of them professional people, who stayed with me." He continued "Gr goire is a professional - Yes, but Gr goire isn't all the professional that he was. He claims to be a lawyer, but he was never admitted to the bar. I just wish that Gr goire had a little of the character and stability his father had. His father was a fine old gentleman, professor Gr goire. But Gilles Gr goire is first and foremost a politician." He concluded "Louis Even, Joe Marcotte and Mercier ... They mixed up other things with Social Credit. But Father Levesque, or Gilles Gr goire's father, professor Gr goire, or some people who were basically students in a very intelligent way, I don't disagree with them at all." As for Caouette, "He was under Gilberte's influence for so long that he seems to have inherited some of her attitudes. He is throwing out those who cannot get along with him, and he becomes smaller and smaller. It is another cycle. Like it was with Gilberte C t ." When the affair of the six occurred,





he estimated: "I am not too sure that Caouette was personally involved; I believe he became involved only in his determination to protect those (old colleagues) who were involved ... Mr. Grégoire is too clever not to have known anything about it. That's why I demanded that Dr. Marcoux bring this thing out, because I knew Grégoire was in on it. This, of course, brought down their fury." They had previously been at odds because of Thompson's apparent preference for Fernand Ouellet, a "new" Créditiste, over Legault, an old-timer, in financial matters. Now Thompson had chosen Marcoux to prosecute the guilty ones, all of them longtime Créditistes. He had chosen them to side with the "new" against the "old" Créditistes. On both sides, continued partnership was intolerable.

g) The third dimension of Créditiste culture: Attitudes towards governmental output.

The third dimension which Verba has outlined is less prominent in reinforcing distinct sub-cultures and supporting the split. Attitudes towards governmental output are basically the same among Social Crediters, both east and west: there is not enough output of a beneficial kind, and the system is inadequate and unfair to a large segment of the population. This is generally what binds them all to the Social Credit party. Nevertheless, there are certain fundamental differences of outlook in regard to 1) the relation between the economic, particularly money and banking, and political systems in terms of rewards 2) the new social welfare legislation and other so-called "socialistic" measures both of which have played a



prominent role in hardening positions in the split. Many of these attitudinal differences have been sublimated into competing doctrinal positions, outlined in part in the section dealing with attitudes towards belief systems.<sup>1</sup> There is a danger, then, of repetition, (which we shall try to avoid as far as this is possible) and a need to distinguish underlying orientations from articulated doctrine (which is not always easy to do). We must bear these pitfalls in mind as we proceed with our analysis.

(1) Beliefs about the relation between the economic and political system and reward. The previous description of the range of attitudes on doctrinal orthodoxy provides a clue to the distribution of beliefs about "who gets what, when, how" in the economic and political systems. Western Social Crediters are clearly the least critical of the way in which the present economic and political systems operate to distribute rewards. The "new" Cr ditistes are rather skeptical of what they regard as oversimplified beliefs of doctrinaire Cr ditistes regarding the banking and economic systems. The "old" Cr ditistes are highly critical of what they regard as a huge swindle on the part of financiers and bankers on the population at large, and are convinced that nationalizing the banks and distributing a basic dividend will cure all the major ills of the system.

The attitude of R al Caouette is fairly representative of the last group. "I feel that we live in a rich country. The old-line parties, could in war-time, find all the necessary

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<sup>1</sup> See above, pp. 155 ff.





billions of dollars to carry on war policies. If they can do it for war, I maintain we can do it for peace, in peace-time." He understands this to be, in Douglas' terms, "an age of abundance" -- where atomic energy, power and automation are rendering man superfluous in many areas of economic life. As a result, a very few people are benefitting from the wealth which should accrue to all, and more and more people are suffering unemployment and deprivation. Caouette's alienation from the existing method of production dates back to depression times. "I was looking for something, because I couldn't accept the system in those days." Then he was introduced to Social Credit, through the newspaper Vers Demain. "It was Social Credit that made me believe that free enterprise is not responsible for what took place; the system is responsible. Free enterprise did everything it could to supply goods and services, and that is the main object of the economic system, to supply goods and services. But to get those goods and services to the consumers, that is an altogether different question. There the government should have taken action. It never did."

By the "system" Caouette meant the monetary and banking system which facilitates the flow of goods and services to the consumer. The fulcrum of the system is the banks themselves, which "take your property or your country as a guarantee and create, out of a stroke of a pen, all the money that the government requires today." This in itself would not be bad, if the bankers did not use their function as agents to line



their own pockets. "They charge interest for it (their intermediary function), and that is what is not mathematically possible, being required to pay interest on something that does not exist. That is why we're short ( of money) everywhere, provincially, municipally or federally. We have a national debt of 23 billion on which we are paying in interest alone every year one billion dollars. This year it's \$1,037,000,000 in interest alone on that debt. The total currency and credit in Canada amounts to approximately \$16 billion. How in the world are we going to pay \$23 billion with \$16 billion?"

Caouette would not accept that bond-holders help sustain the national debt and maintain the flow of credit. "Even the businessmen take the bonds they buy and place them at the bank as collateral for credit that they get from the banks. I would say that 95% of all debentures or bonds or obligations that are in circulation in Canada are in the hands of the banks. And it's nonsense. We say that the public has it. No the public hasn't got it." In other words, in Caouette's conception of the monetary system, everything begins and ends with the bankers, who have complete control of the supply of credit, which they limit deliberately in order to be able to charge high interest rates on loans, and thus make a handsome profit.

Caouette did not define his exact conception of the relation between the economic and political system. He implied, though, that he accepted the old Union des Electeurs theory that the bankers "bought" the party politicians in order to prevent them from curbing their high interests or from





nationalizing their banks. They allegedly did this through the large election funds, which the two old-line parties accumulated. Thus he made much of "patronage, grease in road contracts, organizing for election funds, and things like that."

In Caouette's mind, the solution was to change the system. This meant adopting the Social Credit theory. "The only solution for the problem today, for the current set-up, is to put purchasing power into the hands of consumers in relation to the production in the country. And then the whole economy would start to move by itself." This must not, however, be done by borrowing and incurring new and deferred debt. If we go deeper into debt, that won't solve the problem at all. It may be solved for five or ten years, as when Lesage in the Province of Quebec is ready to borrow \$550 million at 5.3/4% interest for a period of thirty years. At the time of the borrowing, \$550 million will be spent in the province of Quebec, and it will create jobs, attract new industries, but in thirty years from now, when I may no longer be living, my children will have to pay the capital plus the interest, which at that time will amount to \$1,448,000,000. Now if my children ask themselves in thirty years 'Was my father sane or insane?', they'll be right, because we should not be allowed to act that way." Rather, purchasing power should be increased by debt-free payments in the form of dividends, family allowances, and pensions which would not be financed by taxation, but would be tied to the over-all capacity for production in the society. "This would not create inflation, but would get the goods moving towards the consumers."



In that way "we'll save our system. Otherwise you'll see another war before ten years."

There can be no doubt that Caouette actually understands the functioning of the economic system in these simplistic terms. Any economic measure taken by the government is automatically judged in terms of his own framework. Thus austerity measures might be accepted as a short-run emergency measure (though probably not fully understood), but not be tolerated over the long-run. It is, after all, a deflationary policy which is contrary to the expansionary theory of social credit. Old-age pensions, on the other hand, are designed to increase revenue in a certain sector of the economy, and therefore, are seen by Social Crediters in a better light. If financed through higher taxes, however, these pensions are interpreted as but a mere transfer in purchasing power from one sector of the economy to the other, which in Social Credit eyes is still unacceptable. One can therefore understand Caouette's initial adverse reactions to various economic measures introduced by P.C. and Liberal minority governments in Ottawa, and the Lesage Government in Quebec, over the last two or three years. Such adverse judgments as he makes are tempered somewhat by political considerations such as the obvious approval of the electorate for a particular kind of measure (e.g. pensions).

"C's" attitudes on economic policy questions reflect a similar training and approach. For him the monetary system is "so simple ... Credit is 95% of the business of our country.





And credit, whether you like it or not, is simply controlled by a pencil." The banks control the monetary and economic system like the ignition and starter control the automobile, or the switch controls the electric lighting in a room. They print the money or issue the credit, put it into circulation, and thereby set in motion the flow of goods and services. And by withdrawing money and restricting credit, they can bring the system to a halt as well. The solution is to nationalize the banks, or enforce government control over the credit supply. Alternative means for increasing purchasing power among the people may also be used. "I find that we must insist more and more on money and purchasing power which must be issued to the people without conditions. And I find that Douglas, by his two proposals, the national dividend and the compensatory rebate, still advocates the best means for issuing the money."

"C's" position on the relationship between the economic system and the political system is clear. "The old-line political parties are financed by the bankers and financiers. They are therefore controlled by them. When one realizes that political parties in many countries, above all in our own, are provided with funds which are ample enough to pay the voters to go and vote every four years, then, at any given moment, the government cannot be the government of the people. It is the government of those who supply the funds which buy the votes and which finance electoral campaigns." It was the thesis of the Union des Electeurs that the network of inter-



national finance controls all governments. "C" clearly continues to adhere to this conspiratorial idea. "We are going to do exactly what international finance does when a government doesn't want to follow its directives"... "Take for example the current situation in which the orthodox financiers control the government. You know that when a government wants to move too much against the orthodox economy, it is blocked, it is even dismissed in an election. Why shouldn't the people have the same protection that the financiers have today?"

The "new" Cr ditistes did not purport to have studied the economic and monetary system in such detail. But they were somewhat skeptical of a number of important aspects of the old "berets blancs" theory. "S" would admit "that the birth of credit comes through the chartered banks, and accrues to their profit, and that this was not acceptable. He also felt that credit should be made available "only after study, after compiling statistics, and according to the needs of the country, rather than according to the whim of a few people, or the Government members." And he thought that "if necessary, a form of dividend might be given -- family allowances or a similar kind of payment." But "that is about all (of the 'old' Cr ditiste theory) that I will subscribe to". He disagreed with Caouette on the nature of the dividend. "The first way to help the country is to have the Bank of Canada give birth to credit (rather than the chartered banks) and give the bank effective power over its circulation. Then, and only after that, if there is still inequality between purchasing power and production, this





could be adjusted by the provincial governments through dividend payments. For me (unlike for Caouette), the dividend is not a prerequisite. There are other means of adjusting the purchasing power to the gross national product." He also differed with Caouette on his understanding of the nature of the equation between purchasing power and production. "It is not an equation, a one-to-one equation between the one and the other. If we increase the purchasing power a little, the gross national product will be taken care of. There is no need to equalize them completely because of velocity circulation (of money). We can have more products in circulation than the exact amount of money that will buy them." Finally, he could not accept Caouette's complete aversion to banks. "For Caouette, banks are satanic institutions and it is absolutely necessary to get rid of them by giving to the Bank of Canada the power to issue credit, by increasing the liquid reserve of the chartered banks to 100%. That's a viewpoint that I can't accept." According to "S", "While it is true that the chartered banks, by their power to create credit, restricted the progress of the government and hurt the development of the country, it is absolutely false to say that banks per se harm the development of industries, since it is the banks themselves which allow these industries to be developed." "S" would have the Bank of Canada and the chartered banks coordinated to permit a dual policy of private industrial development and public development." I say the following: credit at present is created by the chartered banks as a function of their liquid reserve; if the Bank of Canada were to keep all the deposits



of the chartered banks, that would determine the quantity of credit created by the chartered banks. Likewise, if the Bank of Canada had these deposits in hand, that would determine the credit it could issue. Thus, if Chartered Bank X were to issue credit favouring the development of General Motors or Company Y, it would do it by the normal expansion of credit which is redistributed after that through salaries, intermediaries, etc. If, from the same liquid reserve fund, the Bank of Canada were to issue credit to develop the country, either by establishing services, or public works, then that would redound to the benefit of the public at large rather than to one industry or manufacturer. The chartered banks would continue to carry out the same expansion in credit in the province for private companies and for ordinary industry, whereas the Bank of Canada would carry out expansion in credit for governmental and social services."

"T" and "U" showed a similar independent outlook. "T" felt "that Caouette in his speeches put his finger on the heart of the malady which society suffers, disequilibrium between production and consumption, and mal-distribution of wealth." He believed that "it would be necessary at some given time in the future to carry out a reform of the monetary system." But he balked at the idea, which he found pervasive among the "old" Cr ditistes, that "everything was bad in the present system and everything had to be reformed. And everything was good in the system of social credit." And he could not accept the national dividend. "It's absolutely ridiculous. It should never have been adopted. I have the impression that it did us considerable harm in various election campaigns of the past.





How many times was Caouette reminded of that ridiculous proposal of distributing \$100 a month to every Canadian as a national dividend. I never believed in it, and I still am unable to believe in it ... it's impossible. Much has been said about inflation upon the application of Social Credit principles. I think that we would take a gigantic step towards inflation by handing over to every citizen a dividend of \$100 a month. At that time, what would the money be worth?" "U" also conceded that "the monetary doctrine made good sense." And he was even inclined to accept the basic dividend, with certain qualifications. But he had "always reproached Caouette for not telling the whole truth about Social Credit. Even if the system of Social Credit were put in operation today, it wouldn't bear fruit immediately. A minimum of 15 years would be necessary." And concerning the dividend, "to give \$100 a month to everybody, as Caouette advocates, would be dangerous at present if there weren't a means to counterbalance this expenditure. We can't simply depend on the natural wealth of the country to guarantee the money. There's the value of the currency on the international market to contend with." The solution, then, is "to accept social security measures in the form they exist today until the time when a national dividend can be distributed which would replace all national social security measures."

There was obviously much potential for conflict in this sphere. We may recall that it arose even before the 1962 election. For example, in the 1961 convention Caouette had led a group of "old" Cr ditistes in proposing that a basic dividend be



included in the platform. In the 1962 election campaign he returned to this proposal, despite its earlier rejection. And in the 1962-3 Parliament he often embarrassed his western colleagues and the "new" Cr ditiste M.P.'s by issuing certain statements along these lines. Among his own supporters, particularly those who had formerly belonged to the "berets blancs" such statements never harmed him. They accepted his framework and approach on these questions of economic and monetary theory. The following statements exemplify their attitudes on such questions: "Two bank directors came to meet Caouette to discuss the following proposition with him: if he needed money in the future, they would lend it to him, etc. They were trying to make him change his mind about them. But nothing changed." "The old parties have always governed the population with money." "As R al has often told us, we don't know the mechanics of a machine, but if we put the key in it, then it goes and we know that it is working well. We let others more educated (avanc s) than us study and control it." "There are 8 chartered banks controlled by 50 directors each; that makes 400 individuals who control the thing that controls everything else. It's an economic dictatorship." "There is a certain movement in the Province of Quebec that tries to corrupt federal politicians... French-Canadian politicians especially." (L). "If the government used the Bank of Canada to distribute money, this money would not be lost. They have planted in our heads the idea that it is necessary to have gold to make money. Not so!" (L) "The good Lord gave us natural resources for our use. It's not for dogs." (L).





But among western Social Crediters these attitudes caused much heartache. Many felt as Robert Thompson did that the Cr ditistes "are not practical. They talk about things in the implementation of Social Credit which scare away the technical people who know a little about the operation of the economy. They make such fantastic promises to overthrow or upset our economy in implementing social credit. These things would be absolutely wrong. They talk about a \$100 per month dividend, they talk about raising the tax exemption to \$5,000 immediately, and they talk about spending billions of dollars. You can't do that. This is where they just don't apply reason. This is where we had our basic difference. We had agreed that we would not talk in terms of figures, that we would only talk in terms of principles, and this is where Caouette completely disagreed."

Thompson had originally joined Social Credit in the 1930's "At first I had no interest in the Aberhart movement. To me, as a young student, it did not seem to have too much foundation. But I attended a number of meetings and I found that Aberhart was talking with logic. From there I went to the writings of Douglas himself.." This theoretical education was supplemented by a practical training while he was overseas in Ethiopia from 1944 to 1959. "We had a Social Credit economy operating in Ethiopia from 1944 until 1950. When the World Bank came in, and the International Monetary Fund, we had to set up a completely new banking system, and we did it as a state bank. It was not private enterprise, and it was not the way it should be in my opinion at home, but under those circumstances



we had no alternative... I got to know a great deal about the working of the banking system as it was set up over there, which was similar to what we have, and I also became familiar at first hand with all the operations of international finance." As a result, he no longer accepts Douglas' conception of the economic system as completely accurate or up-to-date. "Our situation today is far different from what it was in the days when Douglas first explained Social Credit principles. We had no social services at all from the government. None of what we know as the welfare state was here. Automation had not been developed as it has been developed since. We have moved into an age of plenty and then we were still operating in an age of scarcity." The same attitudes are shared by other Albertan Social Crediters, including Premier Manning himself. "Mr. Manning has had years of proven experience as a government administrator, and his way of expressing Social Credit takes a very definite pattern in the light of this experience." Thompson himself tends to "express Social Credit in terms of foreign trade. This is something Douglas does not talk very much about."

There is conflict with Caouette on many different points. Mr. Thompson clearly does not have the same jaded image of banks and bankers. "I have had many meetings with bankers, with presidents of banks, some of whom are my good friends, because I believe that the implementation of Social Credit is the only way a private bank can exist and survive ... much to the amazement of people, and to the consternation of my critics." He has a much more pragmatic and relativistic view of the





faults in the present economic system: "Presently, capitalism is not the answer to our current economic problems because it is failing; the only way we can make present-day capitalism succeed is to bring about certain basic reforms in it to make the system adjust to the current situation, and (these reforms) are Social Credit. Until we actually meet the problem posed by automation, the problem posed by our tremendous ability to produce and our complete inability to distribute...we will continue in the difficult situation that we are (presently) in, but one day we will be straightened out...when we get out (of our present bind-piecemeal socialism) and get our perspective cleared, then some of these things will come back into order." And he is much more tolerant of the existing political party system and its function, calling only for "realignment rather than wholesale reform."

"There is going to have to be a realignment ... this is not a political party thing, it is a principle. There are only two philosophies and two principles on the political scene in Canada today that are basic, and because our political parties don't fit into them, we are having troubles. One is socialism, the other is social credit ... I am not interested in perpetuating a party by the name of Social Credit. If I am convinced that another party is implementing the necessary basic reforms, whether they call it Social Credit or not, I will be out there to help them implement it." There is no sign here of the Cr ditiste concern for election funds and bondage to financiers.

These differing conceptions of the economic and monetary systems as they relate to governmental output might have been



reconciled to enable the working partnership to continue. But the stresses and strains in other spheres proved too much. Social Credit of western Canada and old-time *créditisme* of Quebec are two very different approaches to economics and governmental output. In spite of the widespread feeling that both subscribe to the same doctrine, they share little besides the name, some broad general principles about production and distribution, and a few catch-word phrases derived from Major Douglas' writings. It is hardly enough to ensure a smooth-working relationship where other factors making for union are absent.

(2) Attitudes towards social welfare legislation, socialism, and the expansion of the state apparatus: Here there is much closer union in views; most social crediters, east and west, are strongly opposed to socialism of any kind. Modern-day social credit almost defines itself exclusively in these terms. One can recognize it as much in Robert Thompson's attitudes as in Réal Caouette's, in Dr. Marcoux's verbal pronouncement as much as in Laurent Legault's. For Caouette, "We oppose government ownership or control over the economy because we feel that it encroaches on the dignity of the human being and the freedom of the human being, and it is also a kind of barrier to personal initiative. We have to create an economic climate in which personal initiative will be encouraged." Thompson sees socialism and greater state centralization as "subservience of the individual to the state...socialism has never developed on its own strength; it has always been a parasite on something that has been done before." According to "C", "There is at present a socialist upswing in the province, in the present government.





There are measures being passed which run contrary to Social Credit principles and which are carrying (glissant) us to the left." "S" expounded, "I have a kind of natural aversion to socialism. In philosophic terms, I am not able to accept that the state, which is constituted of individuals, can be better than the individuals themselves. I tell myself that it is unthinkable that a state can give better service than a group of individuals who, above and beyond a certain interest for the common good, have a particular incentive either to make a profit or to work for their own advantage or that of their employer."

There are some significant deviations from this rule. "T" was ready to accept certain socialistic measures. "Whether one likes it or not, government is going to be obliged by force of circumstances to extend its powerful arm into many domains. Then, little by little, this mentality, this fear of socialism,

will lessen, it will diminish continually." Lessard shared his views. And "Olsen is not against, a priori, a socialist measure. He is ready to accept it, with modifications. For example, on a measure like the pension plan, which is somewhat socialistic, since the government collects money from everyone and gives pensions to everybody, Olsen doesn't see things from this angle. He says: 'That will create a deposit of money which will permit the government after to cease its borrowings, since it will have money in hand'." Nevertheless the deviants are in a minority in both groups.

More important than any doctrinal conflict on this point, perhaps, is the attitude towards the practice which has evolved



in Social Credit of Alberta. As many Cr ditistes see it, Premier Manning espouses social credit principles, but passes certain socialistic measures. "They go in for old age pensions, they go in for a little social welfare legislation here and there, but that is really socialism, not Social Credit. Social Credit never says: take away from one to give to others." There is a recognition, however, that Manning's administration is conservative, efficient, and generally opposed to governmental interference in the private sector.

h) The fourth dimension of Cr ditiste culture: Attitudes towards the process of political decision-making:

1) Sense of efficacy: There did not seem to be a significant difference in the sense of one's own efficacy in the political decision-making process which western, "new" and "old" Cr ditistes displayed. In general, the attitude was that the political system could be strongly influenced, particularly through opposition political parties. The agreement on this point was an important factor in the original union in 1960 between east and west wings. The "berets blancs" had discouraged its members from seeking to spread social credit through political parties and elections, particularly after 1949. They put much faith in pressures applied at various levels of government: federal, provincial, and municipal. They succeeded in delaying the passage of certain legislation which the Cr ditistes regarded as undesirable: higher taxes, for example, in property. But they rarely managed to prevent its eventual adoption. And they could not bring any of the men in power to





adopt certain of their own planks, such as higher family allowances, higher widow's pensions, etc. Caouette decided that these methods were proving ineffectual: "I found that the Union des Electeurs was going nowhere." So he formed his own movement to engage in electoral action.

It is clear that Caouette conceived of his movement as a political party rather than as a movement which would either seek to form a government, or would try to influence policy from the opposition backbenches. "Party or movement, I don't care what you call the Ralliement, it's all the same to me." This was a clear departure from the philosophy of the Union des Electeurs leaders, who were always anxious to distinguish their "movement" from the so-called "political parties". There was not, however, 100% agreement on this point. For "C" the distinction was important. "I see a great difference in the two. First, in the control of the movement; we avoid becoming for example, like the Union Nationale in the Province of Quebec, which was led by the M.P.'s. It was a political party; the M.P.'s controlled everything. We don't want that in the Ralliement. We want the Ralliement to remain the instrument of the people, of the elite in each constituency. The second thing to avoid is that the Ralliement des Cr ditistes must never fall under the domination of financial powers who would control them. These are the two things to avoid." This was clearly a residue of the experience with the Union des Electeurs. In the case of "C", it served his own ends, namely to keep control of the movement in the hands of the party activists outside Parliament, including himself. But there was also the aura of political



purity which the distinction preserved for the Cr ditistes and which served to influence the voter. Caouette himself was sensitive to this factor: he constantly emphasized that the Ralliement was not like other political parties, that it was responsible to the electorate rather than to the election financiers, etc.

On this point Robert Thompson was quite inclined to agree. He saw the Social Credit Party strictly in party terms, unlike his precursor Solon Low. But he was not satisfied with political parties as presently constituted. He, too wanted to present Social Credit as an entirely new kind of party, one which was not corrupt and susceptible to political machinations. But he was more inclined to see reform in terms of realignment rather than democratization per se. The parties should be reconstructed along the lines of true principle, and as far as the present system is concerned "there are only two philosophies or two principles in the political scene today that are basic: one is private competitive free enterprise and the other is the socialistic state enterprise. I don't know how or when but there is going to be a division in the House on basic principles, and when that comes, I will be in it, because I think that is our only hope. But just to become lost in a party machine of the Conservatives or the Liberals, when they are not really doing anything to solve these fundamentals, doesn't appeal to me."

Whereas the difference between "party" and "movement" became a fundamental part of the conflict between the Union des Electeurs and the National Social Credit Association under





Solon Low, it never contributed to the Caouette-Thompson split. Even when the question of party loyalty arose in the "affair of the six", Caouette never argued that the nature of the Ralliement permitted its members to belong to two different parliamentary groups simultaneously. In the case of a movement, this might have been permissible. As long as the Cr ditistes were part of a national political party, designated Social Credit, dual membership or loyalty was forbidden. Nevertheless, it may well be that the tradition of loose affiliation and local autonomy in the Union des Electeurs ideology influenced the former "berets blancs" members, G rard Perron and Gilberte Rondeau, to pledge support to the Liberals without even consulting their party leaders in advance. Both, after all, had participated in the 1956 "front" with the provincial Liberals in which Cr ditistes like R al Caouette had run as Liberal candidates.

The similarity in roles perceived for the two wings of Social Credit by their respective leaders, Thompson and Caouette, is reflected in the similar campaign slogan which they adopted in consecutive elections. In 1963 Thompson appealed to the voters to elect enough Social Credit members to give the party "the balance of power" in Ottawa. In 1965 R al Caouette campaigned on the slogan: "elect 50 Cr ditistes to the federal House and give them the balance of power in Ottawa."

The other M.P.'s generally had the same conception of their role: they were at most a "ginger group", a minority party, which could exercise certain pressure in order to bring about



small but important reforms in Ottawa. They were educators of their electorate, responsible to them in the sense that they were easily accessible, willing to help, anxious to inform. They were not, however, able to cope with every personal problem, or engineer miracles in the day-to-day administration of employment, taxation, and licensing regulations. According to "B" "We helped to clarify the bicultural situation in Canada." "T" had tried to execute his self-defined role as "the envoy of the people" largely through intermediate bodies such as unions, chambers of commerce, parish associations. It was impossible to meet with all the individuals who want to see their deputy. "Personal contact, from individual to individual, is practically impossible... as a federal M.P. I would receive about ten people per week, that's all, that's a maximum, people who have direct problems with the federal government." "U" felt that "the role of the deputy is conditioned by his personality, his intellectual background. He makes suggestions only when he is the spokesman in the party or the specialist in a domain in which he can accomplish something. Most of the time the deputies rely on a few deputies in the party and only see to organizing for their next campaign ... they also represent the people. That forms an integral part of the function of a deputy. The people see in their deputy their intermediary, someone important who intervenes for them, even if it doesn't concern him at all. We can't send them to the devil ... even if our efforts don't yield a practical result, it pleases people to see that we are concerned about them."





It was perhaps because the role of the ordinary opposition deputy was perceived to be so mundane and limited that certain of the more ambitious Cr ditistes sought to enhance their position through negotiation and intrigue. There was talk of obtaining cabinet posts for Thompson and Marcoux and even for Chapdelaine. Perron and Rondeau undoubtedly hoped to attain certain special favours from a minority Liberal Government in signing the pledge to support them in office. Girouard and Ouellet did not hesitate to cross the floor and join the P.C.'s H.A. Olsen was delighted by the possibility that he could become a Liberal Minister of Agriculture. Such displays of tenuous party loyalty were as common in one wing of the party as the other. And they inevitably caused strains within the party. Charges and countercharges of infidelity flew back and forth within the Social Credit caucus during and after the "affair of the six". They were obviously an important precipitating factor in the split. Likewise, the various displays of infidelity caused serious strains within the lower and middle echelons of the party. After the "affair of the six" a number of the chief organizers in the party pressed for the expulsion of the signatories. They were only partially placated by the convening of the assembly in Quebec in May, 1963, in which R al Caouette and Laurent Legault defended the accused.

(2) Provincial participation: After the formal split in 1963, there was a widespread feeling among many activists that the party was losing its effectiveness in Ottawa. A number were immediately alienated from the party. Others sought to downgrade



the entire importance of a French Canadian deputy in Ottawa, and argued for a more active role in provincial politics. Others proposed combined action on both fronts, pending possible changes in the political climate.

There is an indication of the disarray in which the party found itself before the 1965 election in the variety of opinions expressed on participation in provincial politics. A former federal M.P. advocated a union between Cr ditistes and the Union Nationale. Another opposed this on the grounds that the Ralliement would then become "a political party like all the others". The chief organizer for Caouette felt "the government closest to us is the one we should occupy ourselves with", namely the provincial government. He called for Caouette to resign his Ottawa seat and become provincial leader. And yet, in a special survey conducted by the provincial executive in January 1964, only 48% supported the proposition that R al Caouette should take over the leadership of the provincial wing, 48%<sup>1</sup> were opposed, and 4% were undecided. Caouette himself was opposed to provincial action and his own participation therein, claiming that "I don't think it would be the proper thing at this time to enter provincial politics". He refused to submit himself as a candidate for the provincial leadership. Laurent Legault was much more anxious to oppose "the leftist swing" in provincial politics. In August, 1965, he became provincial leader, but hinted that he would resign if R al Caouette changed his mind. Gilles Gr goire was reluctant to commit himself on the matter.

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<sup>1</sup> From the provincial Council meeting, Montreal, January 1964.





The interest in provincial participation was not merely a result of the 1963 split; it preceded it and in some sense helped to precipitate it as well. In the November, 1962 provincial election, certain members of the Quebec party began to call for Cr ditiste participation in the election. Caouette held aloof. But Dr. Marcoux, who wished to be the provincial leader, gave his complete support to this idea. Fernand Ouellet, the national organizer and financial supervisor, also approved. The movement came to naught. But it left the party divided, at least between Caouette and Marcoux. Not all the "new" Cr ditistes who later stayed with Thompson agreed with Marcoux's and Ouellet's stand. Chapdelaine was opposed because he felt the constitutional limitations to provincial legislation in the monetary field would weaken the party's provincial appeal. "T" commented: "Despite all the admiration I have for Marcoux, I could never share his opinion on the effect that provincial political action would have." The people have kept their allegiance to the traditional parties which had been bought over time by patronage. "The little entrepreneurs, the families which have some member who works for the provincial government, even those who receive pensions, family allowances of all kinds, these people let themselves be influenced by this fact, and vote accordingly. Whereas on the federal level, there isn't the same attention to these things." Even Thompson himself was lukewarm, abstaining from the issue on the grounds that he did not have sufficient knowledge of Quebec provincial politics.



Nevertheless "at that time, it was considered a crime (by Caouette) to have even thought of entering provincial politics".

A number of points of cleavage existed then, even within this broad general area of agreement over the political decision-making process. It is no wonder, then, that on more fundamental issues, the unity of the two wings could not be maintained.





## CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

It was previously established (in Chapter IV) that the split between the Ralliement des Créditistes and the national Social Credit Party took place at the élite level between M.P.s and organizers who regarded themselves as "old" Créditistes and those who were called "les nouveaux". The "new" Créditistes preferred to stay with the national Social Credit party under the leadership of Robert Thompson. In other words, speaking in terms of party integration or separation on the national level, the "old" Créditistes were the "separatists" and the "new" Créditistes the "integrationists".

Does the split in the Social Credit Party have any significance beyond that party itself? What can it illustrate in more general terms for the problem of integration of the two major sub-cultures (French and English) in Canada itself?

It appears to this writer that the distinction between "old" and "new" Créditistes, which was made by the Créditistes themselves, is in a real sense a microcosm of the larger divisions appearing in French-Canadian society today, as that society evolves and changes. Such changes are occurring at the level of the political decision-making élite as well, so that they pose a most difficult



problem for those concerned about political party integration in Canada. It is precisely this phenomenon, in varying guises and forms, which underlies the recent splits that have occurred in all four major parties.

The division in French-Canadian society which the author is referring to is that of the "traditional" versus the "modern" French-Canadian political man. These are the "prototypes" of the typical political actors which are found to coexist everywhere in societies undergoing political development and change. That French-Canadian society is experiencing this kind of transformation can hardly be disputed. Every careful observer and student of the French-Canadian scene has pointed to this as the most striking feature of French-Canadian life since 1960. After some delay, Quebec is currently experiencing the political revolution which every social analyst assumed would accompany its earlier economic and social development.

The "traditional" French-Canadian political man is one who subscribes to the traditional political values and beliefs of a conservative, Catholic and politically lax society. The political beliefs, attitudes and emotive symbols of French-Canada are shaped by the Church, the *économie élite* of commercial, financial and industrial interests and the political party *élite* made up largely of professionals and old property-owning French-Canadian





1  
families.

The "transitional" French-Canadian political man has begun to reject some of the old values, but has not yet fully embraced the political ideas of a modern, industrialized and politically mature society. The political beliefs which he rejects are those which are most obviously related to the social and economic inequities which surround him, and which he is now sufficiently conscious of to react against. The mass media and communications and transportation systems are most largely responsible for his "awakening". He reacts against the notion that government should not represent the interests of the "little man", that it should not intervene to improve the quality of economic life in the society, that government should allow the Church and private institutions to continue to manage the education of children without much interference or regulation, that the political and electoral system should be the exclusive preserve of men belonging to two traditional parties, each of which is committed to maintaining the economic and social dominance of its allies, and to preventing the passage of legislation which can seriously upset this equilibrium. On the other hand, he is not yet willing to embrace the attitudes typical of a secular, economically industrialized, politically pluralist society:

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P.E. Trudeau, La Grève de l'Amiante (les éditions Cité Libre, Montréal, 1956), pp. 13-14.



he is unwilling to subscribe completely to government control and regulation of a secular educational system, is not yet convinced that government regulation and control of the economy can co-exist with private enterprise, and is skeptical about the opportunities for political representation and reform which would allow the downtrodden to take their place in the political system beside the economically privileged. He therefore is attracted to party ideologies and programmes which are cast in the most militant terms, and are often ambivalent in their expressions of loyalty to the system itself.

The "modern" French-Canadian political man has fully abandoned the old norms and entered into modern society as a politically mature citizen. He now accepts secular and state-controlled education as a fact of modern life in industrialized western societies, is attuned to the programmes and ideas of the "mixed economy", and is an advocate of open, competitive political parties representing all segments of society.

The pattern outlined is one which has been suggested by social analysts as typical of political development in all western industrialized societies. What makes the French-Canadian political man different from the political man in other societies is the ethnic fact: that he is French-Canadian in a largely English-speaking North-American milieu,





that his language, culture, history and way of life is quite different from that of his English-speaking compatriots, and that in entering modern economic and political life, he is doing so aware of his ethnic difference and fully prepared to defend, preserve and even exploit it.

What has all this to do with the split between the Cr ditistes and the Social Credit party? It is our hypothesis that the distinction between "old" and "new" Cr ditistes so crucial in bringing about the split is merely a particular mode and manifestation of the more general differences between "traditional", "transitional" and "modern" French-Canadian political man. The "old" Cr ditistes who followed R al Caouette and Laurent Legault fall largely into the sub-group which we would characterize as "traditionally-oriented transitional" political men, whereas the "new" Cr ditistes who remained loyal to Robert Thompson fall primarily into the sub-group "modern-oriented transitional" political men. The conflict between them is one which characterizes relationships in all the major political parties and institutions in French-Canadian society today: that between the "old" and the "new" style and mores of political action. In some of these parties and institutions the conflict is less overt, and is somewhat mitigated by other factors, such as common allegiance to political party symbols, historical memories, and shared



past experiences. It is, nevertheless, one that is very much a factor in their current political attitudes and behaviours.

Now such a broad hypothesis needs to be substantiated by much evidence on every level and in every sphere of social action related to the Social Credit-Créditiste political man. Ideally, one would first be required to relate the belief and value system of the Créditiste actors to the belief and value system of the "transitional" type of French-Canadian political man. Secondly, one would relate the social and economic characteristics which tend to cohere in and be identified with this "transitional" type of French-Canadian political man to the socio-economic make-up of the Créditiste actors, in order to discover parallels. Finally, one would compare the pattern of political behaviour most generally associated with the "transitional" type with the patterns of political behaviours exhibited by the different Social Credit actors. In other words, one would explore every category in the paradigm of political behaviour outlined in Chapter 11 for parallels.

Such a task is beyond the scope of the present work. In the remaining pages, we shall confine ourselves to pointing out some of the major parallels between different sub-categories of "transitional" French-Canadian party politicians and the different élite groups in the Quebec Social Credit party. Then we shall try to generate





a number of further hypotheses related to party integration in Canada, based on out major hypotheses concerning the transformation of the Cr ditiste man.

Let us be clear that we are talking exclusively of party  lites. In the Social Credit party this encompasses only the small group of leaders at the apex of the party pyramid: the M.P.s, the defeated candidates, the party's provincial executive (made up only in part of its M.P.s), and one or two of its leading organizers in each of its provincial strongholds. In the other parties it generally includes, besides the M.P.s and candidates the small number of full-time party professionals, and the major organizers, a few large contributors to the party coffers who do not participate actively in party meetings, and certain old-time party notables who exert influence at more critical moments, such as that of choosing a new party leader.

In the preceding chapter we were able to isolate clearly distinct patterns of political attitudes for those who identified themselves as "old" or "new" Cr ditistes. The "old" Cr ditistes showed themselves to be generally more "traditional" in their primitive beliefs about religion and politics, authority and leadership, democracy and in their ideologies. They have a stronger sense of a distinctive national identity as French Canadians and Catholics than the "new" Cr ditistes. They perceive themselves as lower in class and status than other political groups in the society



and demonstrate a greater sense of camaraderie and "in-group cliquishness" with old friends and acquaintances than do the "new" Cr ditistes. They also see themselves as more deprived by the distribution system, and they have a much more simplified and distorted view of how the economic and monetary systems function. They are generally more fervently opposed to social welfare and socialist legislation, particularly on emotional grounds. Finally they are perhaps more willing to use a variety of alternative channels for promoting their political and ideological ends than are the "new" Cr ditistes, who incline more to purely political party action.

It should be clear that these attitudes of the "old" Cr ditistes reflect in an overall sense a more "traditionally-oriented" political culture than those of the "new" group. It remains to locate these attitudes in the spectrum of ideal political cultures defined by the continuum of the "traditional-transitional-modern" French-Canadian political man.

To this writer, it seems obvious that the beliefs of Cr ditistes of all stripes (including those who have remained loyal to the Union des Electeurs) represent at least to some degree a "transitional" rather than a "traditional" political culture. They are all aware of the inequities of the economic system, and are attempting to counteract them. They are all opposed to the traditional outlook of the two "old-line" parties, and are attempting to alter or combat





these parties. On the other hand, they are committed to change which they believe will not alter fundamentally their traditional way of life: the opportunity for individual economic initiative, religious and Catholic education, small town, urban or rural living, and close bonds among family and friends.

On the other hand, it is clear that the beliefs of the "new" Cr ditistes approximate much more closely the "ideal-type" belief syndrome of the "modern" political man. Most of them accept the doctrine of Social Credit, and for that matter, any rigid doctrine or ideology, only in a most superficial sense. They tend to share most of the more pragmatic political attitudes of "modern" and "transitional" Quebec political men in the two old-line parties, except that they are more inclined to political reform in the party system, more open to ideas of economic and monetary reform, particularly with respect to the chartered banks, and are convinced that they can better advance their political ideas and ambitions in a "minor", reform-minded political party like Social Credit than in one of the two national parties.

The precise line of division in the attitudes of "new" and "old" Cr ditistes is, of course, impossible to demarcate. There are some "old" Cr ditistes, particularly those who are more senior in age, who have more distinctly "traditional" orientations, as defined primarily by their



primitive political beliefs. On the other hand, some of the younger followers of Caouette are quite "modern" in their political outlooks, so that there is little apparent difference between their framework of political action and that of the "modernistes". It is their pattern of political behaviour (particularly their willingness to associate with the "old" group for reasons of political advantage and their affinity for political intrigue) and their pattern of past political affiliations (for example, whether they did or did not belong to the Union des Electeurs) which most clearly determines the pattern of their political allegiances to one or the other group.

Analysis of the socio-economic characteristics of these two major groups of party actors tends to reinforce this hypothesis. Among the members of parliament who remained loyal to Caouette after the 1963 split, the five who were described by Dr. Marcoux as most "orthodox" in their attitudes<sup>1</sup>, were also those who were eldest (average age 53), were born, grew up and continue to live in the same small locales in rural counties (that is, they had little or no mobility), had the lowest number of years of education, and had the longest

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1. They were: H. Latulippe (Compton-Frontenac), G. Laprise (Chapleau), C.E. Dionne (Kamouraska), C.A. Gauthier (Roberval), and L.P.A. Bélanger (Charlevoix).





membersip in the Union des Electeurs before joining the  
Ralliement.<sup>2</sup> Three of them, however, were prominent citizens  
of their local communities, having served as mayors or  
aldermen for some years before being elected to the federal  
Parliament.<sup>3</sup>

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2

Calculated from information obtained from the Canadian  
Parliamentary Guides for 1963-5, the Créditiste newspapers  
Regards and Vers Demain, and interviews.

3

They were: L.P.A. Bélanger, alderman and mayor of Beupré,  
C.A. Gauthier, alderman and mayor of Mistassini, and H.  
Latulippe, alderman of Lac Mégantic.



Among the seven other Cr ditistes who followed Caouette after August, 1963, two of them (Rondeau, Perron) were instigators of the manoeuvres by Caouette designed to undercut the power of the "new" group. They were, moreover, the main planners among the signatories of the famous telegram which was signed by the "six" in April, 1963, and which helped bring the conflict between "new" and "old" Cr ditistes into the open. The four other signatories were all younger members of the same group which remained loyal to Caouette. Their average age was only 34, and yet all had been members of the Union des Electeurs before joining the Ralliement. They appeared to have had more formal education, more geographic mobility, and jobs with higher status in the occupational pyramid, but they were not so prominent in their local communities.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Information obtained from the Canadian Parliamentary Guides, 1963-5, and from interviews. The "six" were: G. Perron (Beauce), G. Rondeau (Shefford), R. Langlois (M gantic), P.A. Boutin (Dorchester), R. Beaul  (Quebec-East) and L. Plourde (Quebec-West).





Any possibility that they might have aligned themselves with the "new" Cr ditistes was dissipated after the signing of the telegram and the subsequent party inquiry conducted by Dr. Marcoux, a leader of the "new" group. It was the doctor who pressed for their prosecution, whereas R al Caouette had rallied to their defence. They had little choice but to remain with the man who had accorded them the greatest amount of sympathy in their moment of distress.<sup>2</sup>

There remains the single case of Gilles Gr goire. Although he might have qualified as a "new" Cr ditiste by age, mobility, education, occupation,<sup>3</sup>

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One of them, Plourde, who was on the best terms with Dr. Marcoux, did waver, in fact, for a period of time. He finally decided to join Caouette's group.

3

Gr goire is 40 years of age, was born and continues to live in Quebec City, where he went to Laval University and earned his bachelor's and law degree. He is trained as a lawyer, but never was called to the bar. He lists his occupation as "Director of Publicity." Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1965 and interviews.



and by the fact that he had never previously belonged to the Union des Electeurs, certain circumstances militated against his joining their group. First, although he himself had never joined the Union, his father had been one of its most prominent members. Secondly, he had been the major instigator in founding the Ralliement, and regarded himself as a close friend and loyal supporter of Caouette.

Among the 8 defeated former M.P.s who were not directly involved in the split, but who were nevertheless active in the immediately preceding events, including the closed hearing at the time of the "affair of the six", six of them remained loyal to Caouette after the Granby Convention.<sup>1</sup> Five of these six had previously been members of the Union des Electeurs, and at least two were regarded as loyal followers of both Perron and Caouette.<sup>2</sup>

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They were: J.A. Roy (Lévis), B. Dumont (Bellechasse) Philippe Gagnon (Rivière-du-Loup-Témiscouata), Lauréat Maltais (Saguenay), Gérard Lamy (St. Maurice-Lafleche) and André Bernier (Richmond Wolfe). The two who disassociated from the Ralliement were: J.P. Cook (Montmagny-L'Islet) and D. Ouellet (Drummond-Arthabaska). The former was a merchant and decorator who lived in Quebec City, after obtaining his education from St. Malo's College, Quebec Technical School and the Chicago School of Design. The latter was a Drummondville insurance broker. Both had been among Thompson's initial choices as "presidents of temporary parliamentary committees."

2

They were: Gagnon and Lamy. Interview, Dr. Marcoux.





Their average age was slightly lower than the group of orthodox "old" Cr ditistes. But they shared many of the same characteristics as this group: little or no geographic mobility, low level of education, non-professional jobs, and at the same time positions of some prominence in their local communities.<sup>3</sup> The sixth, J.A. Roy, was an affluent, though poorly educated hardware store owner, who had managed to become an alderman in the small but important town of Lauzon in L vis, Quebec.

The non-parliamentary leaders who served on the provincial executive generally exhibited the same social characteristics of the "traditional-to-transitional" political man: little education, little mobility, non-professional status, and former association with the Union des Electeurs coupled with relative affluence and a certain prominence in their local communities. Laurent Legault, owner of Legault Transport in Rouyn, fairly affluent, but of provincial background, having little education, non-professional status, and a "joral speech", is typical of them. But there were others of the same stripe: Alex Bertrand, Adolphe Martin,<sup>4</sup> Herv  Lajeunesse, Jean-Baptiste C t , to name only a few.

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<sup>3</sup> Information obtained from Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1963, and from interviews.

<sup>4</sup> Of Qu bec-Montmorency, Longueuil, Ste.-Marie and Shefford respectively. All are past or present vice-presidents. Information from interviews and congresses.



The chief organizers of the leading constituencies were all relatively prosperous but very provincial and poorly educated store owners, union leaders, or salesmen of small urban communities.<sup>1</sup> All but one of them remained loyal to Caouette after the Granby Convention, even in constituencies in which their parliamentary representative for whom they had worked had not.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> From interviews. They included: Auréle Paquet of St. Rome (Beauce), Victor Cauchon of Beaulieu (Charlevoix), Damase Maltais of Alma (Lac Saint-Jean), Arthur St. Jean of Rouyn (Villeneuve), Albert Guay of Quebec City (Quebec-East), Louis George de Launière of Chambord (Lac St. Jean), Arcade Tremblay of St. Jean Eudes (Chicoutimi), Gérard Beaudoin of Lac Mégantic (Compton-Frontenac), René Tanguay of Cap-de-la-Madelaine (Champlain), and Roland Bertrand of Grondines (Portneuf).

<sup>2</sup> For example, Tremblay of Chicoutimi, Maltais of Lac St. Jean.





Another, Roland Bertrand of Grondines, who also had served on the national Social Credit executive as the representative of the Ralliement, wavered in his support, and became inactive. He was the sole organizer to articulate the attitudes of a truly "modern-oriented" political man. And he also exhibited all of the socio-economic characteristics of the "new", more "modern" Cr ditiste: a professional (accountant), young (35), affluent, well-educated, having a status in his community. He had, however, been a member of the Union des Electeurs, primarily because of his family's affiliation with the same movement, and this may explain his ambivalence regarding the split.

The "new" Cr ditistes seemed to exhibit strikingly different socio-economic characteristics corresponding to their "modern" attitudes. On the whole they were younger than the "old" Cr ditiste M.P.s (their average age was 42). They generally came from larger urban centers, such as Quebec City, Sherbrooke, Rimouski, Chicoutimi, St. Hyacinthe, and Alma. They had considerably more formal education than their counterparts among the "old" group; three of them had been to university, one had been to an agricultural college, and the remaining two had completed commercial courses after graduating from their classical colleges. Their occupations included those generally regarded of high status: two were lawyers, one was a physician, one was a prosperous, technically



skilled farmer, one was a foreman in his factory, one was a broker and one was an architectural draughtsman. All but one had no previous affiliation whatsoever with the Union des Electeurs. In fact they were generally identified with other political parties: three were labelled Conservatives, and one was a Liberal. All of them belonged to some organization of importance or occupied a leading position in their community's organizational life. The physician, Dr. Marcoux, was treasurer of the General Practitioners Association of Quebec and monitor of the Association of Physicians, Surgeons, and Medical Men for the District of Quebec. One young lawyer was a former editor of the Sherbrooke University newspaper and President of the law faculty at the same university. One was a mayor and director of the Chamber of Commerce in his constituency. Another was manager of the Caisse Populaire in his town, a director of an electric firm, a former president of the Saint-Jean Baptiste Society in his area, and a former vice-president of the Chamber of Commerce in the same district. Still another was secretary-treasurer of his municipal council, of his school board, his agricultural co-op, of the Union Catholiques des Cultivateurs, and of this Caisse Populaire.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>

Information from the Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1965 and interviews.





It appears that all of these "new" Cr ditistes had left their organizations in the hands of "old" Cr ditistes: those who were more provincial in their outlook, of lower occupational status, not as well educated, and generally having had some previous affiliation with the Union des Electeurs. A large majority of these organizers appear to have followed Caouette at the time of the split.<sup>2</sup>

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2

From interviews. Even "new" Cr ditistes M.P.s like Chapdelaine and Frenette admitted that large numbers of their organizers deserted them.



The result was that the "new" Cr ditistes were unable to build any kind of organizational base for their subsequent candidature, and consequently, all were soundly trounced in the 1965 election.

Given the fact that there was a clear demarcation between the two groups, defined both by their belief systems and their social backgrounds, the question arises: why were the "new", "transitional-to-modern" type men associated more closely with the western Social Crediters? Were they generally better integrated with their English counterparts? And if so, why?

From the very beginning of their first session together, the "new" Cr ditistes were better integrated with their western counterparts. Although Caouette and Legault had been the first to meet Thompson, it was Dr. Marcoux with whom Mr. Thompson formed the closest initial bond among the Quebec Cr ditistes. His first appointments to positions of prominence in the parliamentary group were largely from the ranks of the "new" group: this was in fact what initially irked the old-time Cr ditistes such as Perron and Rondeau. The early close associates of Mr. Thompson included Maurice Cot , G rard Chapdelaine, Marcel Lessard and Dr. Marcoux.

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1

From interviews. Bertrand also claimed that he was one, having translated one of Mr. Thompson's books into French, and having served on the national Social Credit executive. It is, however, doubtful that he saw Mr. Thompson often in that period.





They occupied the positions of financial critic and assistant to the leader, justice critic, labour critic and whip respectively.<sup>2</sup>

The precise reasons for Mr. Thompson's preference for these men are not clear. He undoubtedly regarded them as the most competent among the group of French-Canadian Cr ditistes. There are no grounds for assuming that he deliberately discriminated against former members of the berets blancs. Although Mr. Thompson was critical of Gilberte and the Union des Electeurs in general, he spoke with respect of J. -Ernest Gr goire, Gilles' father, who was also a leader of that group. The most plausible reason for Mr. Thompson's initial preference for the "new" Cr ditistes, apart from their qualities of greater competence,<sup>3</sup>

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Le Devoir, June 29, 1962 and interviews.

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And the fact that they had achieved a temporary pre-eminence in the party just before the 1962 election, which, however, was undermined shortly after in the Three Rivers Congress.



is that these men had, in his eyes, higher status. Undoubtedly the doctor, lawyer, broker and large-town businessman appeared more congenial to him than was the small-town, poorly educated store-owner. In addition, there was probably a greater meeting of minds between the two groups: certainly they shared more similar attitudes towards politics, as revealed by our interviews.

Status-perception and status-consciousness, as well as affinity in general outlook, are important variables in any relationship among English-speaking and French-speaking M.P.s in Ottawa, who come from such different backgrounds. Mr. Thompson's concern for surrounding himself with men of higher status did not stem merely from a desire to uplift the image of his team; nor was it peculiar to the group of Social Credit M.P.s who were aware that they were regarded as inferior in status, education and (often unjustifiably) in wealth than their counterparts from the other political parties. More important than these variables was the matter of compatibility in outlook and behaviour. Initially Mr. Thompson believed that he would be able to work more closely with the "new" Cr ditistes; as time passed, he was confirmed in this point of view. The erratic parliamentary behaviour of the "old" Cr ditistes, including that of Caouette himself, was subject to much public censure, and Mr. Thompson was constantly forced into the embarrassing position of having to





to justify it. In private caucuses, these matters became bones of some contention, often creating considerable ill will among the members. The line of division between "old" Cr ditistes on the one hand, and "new" Cr ditistes and westerners on the other, emerged very gradually and almost imperceptibly, but it nevertheless appeared almost as a matter of course.

This suggests that in general the "transitional-to-modern" French-Canadian M.P. from Quebec is likely to integrate more readily with his English-speaking counterparts than is the "traditional-to-transitional" M.P. from that province. The phenomenon which was so central in the split between Social Credit and Cr dististe groups should likewise be present in the internal relationships of the other political parties in Canada, if not overtly, at least under the surface.

In order to make this hypothesis more meaningful, we should be more explicit about the socio-economic composition of the English-speaking group that is concerned. In the case of the Social Crediters, the four English-speaking M.P.s were all western Canadians, who were born and had grown up in the central prairie provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba. They were all of



middle-class background and either of Canadian, British or Scandinavian stock. They generally had at least a high school education. Three of the four were trained in teacher's colleges as educators or ministers. All considered themselves to be devout Protestants. They gave their occupations as educator, farmer and merchant, lumberman and minister of the gospel respectively. All were prominent in the social activities of their respective communities and were members of the Chambers of Commerce and other associations connected with their occupations. Although there were only four of them, there is evidence that most of the defeated Social Credit M.P.s from the three provinces and British Columbia<sup>1</sup> reflected rather similar backgrounds.

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From the list of candidates of the Social Credit Party, April, 1963, and from interviews. Information about the four M.P.s was also obtained from the Canadian Parliamentary Guide.





The question which immediately arises, of course, is: can such a sectionally and occupationally narrow and homogeneous group be considered as representative of English-speaking Canadian M.P.s in general? Taking into account only objective socio-economic categories, one would have to reply in the negative. But considering the fact that all of these Social Credit M.P.s had shown considerable mobility during their lives, (three had lived and served in Ottawa as M.P.s in the period 1953-8; the fourth, Mr. Thompson, had been abroad in Ethiopia during the same period), all had had extended previous contacts with French-Canadians, and all were anxious to collaborate with the Quebec representatives as much as possible in order to further their own interests in Ottawa, one might justifiably categorize them as "nationally-oriented" conscientious and cooperative-minded Canadian M.P.s, as likely as any group to get along with their French-Canadian compatriots.

The next question that arises, then, is as follows: is there any evidence that similar kinds of cleavages exist in other political parties which can be explained in a similar fashion? Does one find that the same kinds of natural compatibilities and antipathies in socio-economic composition, background and attitudes of the different M.P.s exist in the Liberal, Progressive Conservative and New Democratic Parties?



It is obvious to any observer of the Canadian party scene that serious cleavages between their Quebec and English-speaking wings exist in all the political parties. They have manifested themselves in different ways. In the Progressive Conservative Party there was friction between Mr. Léon Balcer, the nominal deputy leader, and Mr. Diefenbaker, the party's national leader, which led eventually to the former's resignation from the party. In the New Democratic Party friction between the founders of the party and certain members of its Quebec wing led to the withdrawal of the latter and the formation by them of the Parti Socialiste du Québec. In the Liberal Party conflict between certain Quebec members and the national leadership led to the separation of the federal and provincial Liberal organization in Quebec.

These overt schisms appear to reflect an underlying tension which continues to affect significantly the behaviour of the parties today. One hears reports of great discontent in party caucus meetings of both Liberals and Conservatives. The question of future leadership looms large in both parties, and it is generally linked with English-French relations both in the country and within the party. Occasionally one hears talk of a backbencher revolt against the leaders whose policies and attitudes are generally regarded as conservative and out of touch with current trends in Quebec.





Whether or not these tensions stem from socio-economic cleavages and attitudinal differences similar to those which split the Social Credit party in two is another matter. It must be left to students of political parties more familiar with the internal workings of these three parties to obtain the answer to this question.

It might not, however, be overly bold of the author to suggest a possible method for researching this more general problem of party integration, and perhaps also some very crude hypotheses which might be tested in this direction.

One can hypothesize that wherever internal conflict exists in the parties over matters of a fundamental nature directly or indirectly related to French-English relations, its cause can be found in a fundamental difference in the political orientations of the conflicting individuals and groups. The hypothesis could then be tested by asking a series of questions similar to those which the author used in his interviews of Social Credit leaders. They would be designed to get at primitive political beliefs, and various dimensions of the political orientations of the major actors in each of the parties. If the responses revealed a similar cleavage and clustering of attitudes, then one could conclude that this factor plays a decisive role in internal schism. The attitudinal patterns would have to be related, of course, to the socio-economic characteristics of these actors, in order to allow for more general comparisons between parties.



Some of the questions that might be explored in the course of these interviews are: Is there any apparent division in the other parties between "traditional", "transitional" and "modern" political men from Quebec? Are there serious conflicts between them, or are they well integrated? What factors bind them to the one party? What other factors have mitigated conflict between them? Which parties are the most integrated in these terms, and which the least? What accounts for their differences in this respect?

A few rough "guesses" might be made at this juncture. One would assume that in the two old-line parties there is a wider range of socio-economic "types" among the French-Canadian members than in the Social Credit party before the split. One would predict that they range from the "traditionally-oriented transitional" to the very modern, industrialized and cosmopolitan French-Canadian. One would also predict that conflict is least apparent between English-speaking "modern" Canadians and the "transitional-to-modern" type French-Canadian. The fully "modern" type French-Canadian élitist would tend to defend his ethnic interest in matters related to the modern economy, culture and the mass media, and thus come into greater conflict with his English-Canadian co-partisan than would his less "modernized" compatriot. The more "traditionally-oriented" French-Canadian "transitional", on the other hand, would tend to





come into conflict with his English co-partisan in matters of a narrower, more sectarian and generally more traditional nature, such as the flag, the amendment formula, language usage, the representation of French-Canadians on a certain party or governmental body regardless of its importance in the economic or cultural sphere.

One would also guess that in the New Democratic Party, which is more ideological than the two old parties, conflict between the two ethnic groups would be reified into an ideological or doctrinal schism, even among those who qualify in every respect as "moderns". In fact, one would assume that the "transitional-to-modern" New Democratic French-Canadian would be more amenable to cooperation with his English co-partisans than the fully "modern" French-Canadian socialist ideologue. Whether there is a tendency for most "transitional" French-Canadian socialist élitists to be transformed into "modern" socialist ideologues prone to defend French-Canadian economic interests at every turn, or whether the majority evolve over time into pragmatic social democrats, as appears to be the case with their English counterparts, cannot be determined at this point. It is, however, a question which could be fruitfully explored by using the kind of methodological framework and techniques suggested in this study.



The problems involved in applying this methodology to different political parties vary, of course, from party to party and from issue to issue. They are likely to prove more tractable in the case of a minor party which is not in power, since that party has less to fear in submitting itself to investigation. Thus the Social Credit and N.D.P. parties tend to be more accessible than the Liberals or Progressive Conservatives. Secondly, the problem of reaching conflicting groups within the party and of obtaining information about their differences is considerably alleviated in instances where a full-scale and involuntary rupture has occurred. Even a formal separation such as that between federal and provincial Liberals, if it occurs largely as a result of mutual accommodation, does not lend itself easily to investigation. The relevant actors are unlikely to shed much light on the sources of conflict involved in such a separation, for fear of possible recriminations. And a splitting away by a splinter group, as occurred in Léon Balcer's case, cannot yield much information for rather similar reasons.

There is a further difficulty in the technique itself: one cannot know if the interview responses are authentic representations of the actual orientations and beliefs of the respondents. This, of course, is a problem common to all studies based on interview data. But it is





a more serious one on interviewing party activists, since they are often reluctant to reveal their true feelings lest there be repercussions within the party. The party politician is likely to express what he thinks will serve his party's interest, rather than his own inner feelings.

These problems are not, however, insoluble. A sensitive question can be framed skilfully so as to appear relatively innocuous. The confidence of party personnel can be earned by proper introduction and decorum, and promises of anonymity. One can supplement interviews by speeches and writings which are selected in careful fashion to ensure their representativeness and authenticity. Finally, one can check the responses against actual behaviour to assess their authenticity.

Thus far in this chapter we have confined our discussion to the élite level of political parties. Has our analysis no significance beyond that narrow echelon?

The answer, of course, is that it surely has, since parties are in a real sense a microcosm of the larger society. One can assume that if small, largely rural constituencies like Compton-Frontenac, Charlevoix, Kamouraska, Roberval, and Chapleau send "traditionally-oriented" political types to Ottawa, then they are likely to reflect that kind of political sub-culture themselves. For one thing, these men were among the senior and most active citizens in their



locales. And they boasted of being the true grass-roots choices of the people. On the other hand, larger, more urban and industrialized constituencies such as Québec-Montmorency, Sherbrooke, and Labelle tend to send representatives to parliament who reflect more readily their more "modern" outlook. Thus one would suppose that the political sub-culture in those regions is more "modern" in its orientation.

The hypothesis can only be substantiated by survey analysis or careful voting statistical analysis which correlates socio-economic factors with patterns of party voting. Both these techniques have been applied by other writers.<sup>1</sup>

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1

The survey technique has been used by Maurice Pinard, "Political Factors in the Rise of Social Credit in Quebec", unpublished paper delivered to the Canadian Political Science Association, June, 1964. The voting statistical analyses have been carried out by Vincent Lemieux and William P. Irvine. Their studies are cited below.





Their findings provide strong evidence for the hypothesis that the different Social Credit constituencies reflect to a considerable degree the pattern of "sub-cultures" defined by their candidates.

Professor Vincent Lemieux has found in his constituency study of Lévis that votes for Social Credit in the 1962 election correlate strongly with the socio-economic characteristic of "inferior occupation". He finds that about 60% of "lower occupations" voted for Social Credit, but only about 15% of the "higher occupations."<sup>2</sup>

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1

V. Lemieux, "The Election in the Constituency of Lévis", published in J. Meisel (ed.) Papers on the 1962 Election (U. of Toronto Press, 1964).

2

Ibid., p.44.



Among the former he lists labourers, day-workers, clerks and craftsmen: among the latter he includes professionals, members of religious orders, civil servants, secretaries and office workers, merchants and tradesmen, manufacturers and entrepreneurs. Although under Lemieux's definition, Mr. J. A. Roy, the Cr ditiste candidate who owns a hardware store in Lauzon, would have ranked among those of "higher occupation", his attitudes seem to be more representative of a "lower occupation" group. This may explain why those of lower status than himself responded readily to his message, and more particularly, by his own admission, to that of Mr. Caouette. We can hypothesize that the attitudinal syndrome of these people of "lower occupation" was more representative of the "traditional-to-transitional" type than of the "traditional-to-modern" or "modern" type. On the other hand, the Social Credit voters of "higher occupations" probably reflected a "transitional-to-modern" or "modern" culture. They were probably attracted to Social Credit for reasons apart from any feeling of affinity for either the Cr ditiste leader (Mr. Caouette), or their candidate (Mr. Roy).<sup>3</sup>

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I

On the other hand, Mr. Roy did at least represent one who had achieved a certain status and level of success: he was a well-dressed, well-groomed affluent businessman who made regular trips to Florida during the winter.





Two other findings of Lemieux's study seem to support these conclusions. Lemieux noted that Social Credit cells which had survived from the days of the Union des Electeurs were not numerous and did not appear to play a large role in spreading Social Credit. In Lévis, then, it was the television broadcast of Mr. Caouette that was most significant. The families that were most affected by them were not on the whole the old families of Lévis; rather, they were generally newer, somewhat more mobile families living in smaller locales of the constituency. One would assume that these families reflect a more "traditionally-oriented transitional" political culture, whereas the old families of the large locales would be likely to be either more "traditional" or more "modern".

Lemieux, however, has attempted to define what are, for him, two chief kinds of "créditisme" found in the "mixed" urban-rural constituency of Lévis: that of social and national protest, typical of Liberal-oriented, large urban communities, and that of economic and political discontent, typical of Union-Nationale-oriented, rural or small urban communities. It appears that in 1962 Mr. Roy drew his support about equally from both.



In 1963 and 1965, however, many of those of the first group (social protesters and nationalists) appear to have left<sup>1</sup> his camp, and he consequently lost the election. In attitudinal terms, we might hypothesize that those of the second group were "traditional-t-transitional" French-Canadian type men, whereas those of the first group were<sup>2</sup> made up largely of "transitional-to-modern" men.

Lemieux's province-wide analysis of the Social Credit results<sup>3</sup>

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The reasons for this are complex. One plausible explanation is that the "social nationalism" of Mr. Caouette was now suspect, and his more proper association with those feelings of "economic discontent" generally identified with the rural right had finally been recognized by the first group.

2

The precise distinction between these two types of "créditisme" is not clear, and this diminishes its analytic utility. According to Lemieux, "alongside an urban 'créditisme' (or, to speak more generally, a 'créditisme' of large centers) there seems also to be a rural 'créditisme' (one of small centers). Both these 'créditismes' entail disaffection in the political sphere, against the 'old-line' parties. They also involve discontent with the economic order. This is stronger in the smaller centers and in those lacking in prosperity than in the cities where the 'créditisme' on the other hand, implies a third element almost non-existent in rural 'créditisme': disaffection with the social order. A 'low' occupation is not defined so much by the level of salary as by the status of being dominated..." Meisel, op. cit., p. 51.

3

V. Lemieux, "L'Analyse des résultats électoraux: le cas du Crédit Social au Québec, Recherches sociographiques, 1965.





also supports our hypothesis. Among the socio-economic factors which he correlates with the voting results are: Household, occupation, education, and income. The highest correlation is with those living in small localities, of "inferior" occupations such as manual labourers, transportation and communication workers, artisans (but not necessarily the lowest-paying jobs), and of inferior education. The correlation is not as high with those of low incomes. The "attitudinal" syndrome of the "traditional-to -transitional" type would very likely emerge for any person fitting his socio-economic description of the "typical" Social Credit voter. Those of the lowest incomes, such as the "traditional" types of the Gaspé region, were not among the supporters of Social Credit in 1962.

Lemieux discovered one other relation of interest to us here: unlike in Lévis, the "partisan" dimension, reflecting past party allegiances, did play a significant role in the province-wide results. Lemieux found that in the 31 constituencies in which Social Credit had obtained over 30% of the vote, all but five were among those which had given more than 10% of their vote to Créditistes in the 1948 provincial election. He likewise found a strong correlation between Social Credit strongholds in 1962 and regions where the Créditiste newspaper, Vers Demain, was



most widely circulated in the late 1940's. Lemieux pointed to the significant role which "historical memories" -- the influence that one's recollection of having voted for or subscribed to Cr ditisme 15 years previously -- seemed to have in the overall 1962 result. What is more important, it seems to this writer, is the significance of this factor in indicating the kinds of attitudes which were prevalent in certain regions of Quebec both in the late 1940's and in 1962. There is evidence that Vers Demain, which was printed in Montreal, and the Union des Electeurs organization, which followed the distribution of Vers Demain, were only of interest to certain segments of French-Canadian society -- "traditional-to-transitional" types living outside the largest urban center, Montreal, but sufficiently attuned to "modern" influences to understand the significance of the Cr ditiste political, social and economic protest.

Finally, the findings of William Irvine in his<sup>1</sup>  
 "An Analysis of Voting Shifts in Qu bec"

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<sup>1</sup>  
 Published in Meisel, op. cit., pp. 129-144.





offer perhaps the clearest evidence at the level of the voter in support of our hypothesis. Irvine tested the hypothesis of Vincent Lemieux that the Social Credit vote was made up essentially of two types of "créditisme", that of economic discontent and that of nationalist and social protest. He found that the hypothesis was well-founded in general but that Social Credit appeared to benefit more from the latter kind of protest and in any case, the two were often blurred. For example, he discovered that (in correlating the 1962 vote with the 1961 census data) in about one half the cases, their median earnings had either remained the same or had risen. This was particularly the case in the Saguenay-Lac-Saint Jean region, which encompasses the cities of Chicoutimi, Alma, and Jonquières-Kenogami, and which gave Social Credit the most substantial support of any single region other than Abitibi-Temiscamingue, the home base of the Ralliement.

Irvine attributes this seeming contradiction between economic discontent and rising income to a rising gap between "expectations" and economic realities. In other words, widespread economic discontent existed together with social protest in the Saguenay-Lac St. Jean region because of a growing awareness on the part of the inhabitants of that region that they were falling further and further behind their Montreal and Quebec City compatriots in both income



and social status. The gap in "expectations" had been created largely by the spread of the mass media and transportation facilities which had awakened these citizens to an awareness of their relative inferiority. On the other hand, the inhabitants of a region like the Gaspé, which were both economically worse off and more isolated, were not yet susceptible to these higher economic and social "expectations". This explains their relative disinterest in Social Credit in the 1962 election. Once again, then, it would appear as if the Social Credit voter, like his parliamentary representative and Quebec leader, was a "transitional" rather than "traditional" or modern type, and this "transitionalism" was defined in terms of attitudes reflecting perceptions of his relative economic and social position.

Irvine also found, like Lemieux, that 18 of the 38 constituencies in which Social Credit had increased its vote by 20% over 1958 were in the lowest education bracket. Of some interest were the deviant cases he discovered: Lévis, Québec-East, and Québec-Montmorency in the Quebec City region and Sherbrooke. All of these sent "modern" or "modern-oriented" Créditistes to Ottawa, two of whom were part of the "new" group, and two of whom, although remaining part of the "old" group, were relatively unorthodox in their Social Credit





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The two "modernistes" were Dr. Marcoux and Gérard Chapdelaine. The "unorthodox" Caouettistes were J.A. Roy and Robert Beaulé. By "unorthodox" is meant their lack of concern for doctrine, and their relatively recent affiliation with Social Credit.



Finally Irvine explored the factor of urbanization and pointed out that over one half the constituencies in which Social Credit had amassed over 20% increase in its 1958 vote were designated as wholly urban by the Chief Electoral Officer. In other words, urban centers were as much if not more conducive to the spread of Social Credit as small urban and rural areas. He attributed this to the influence of the "satellite city" complex on Quebec City, Saguenay-Lac Saint-Jean, Rouyn-Noranda, and Eastern Township (Granby-Sherbrooke) inhabitants. Those in Quebec City compared themselves to their larger and more prosperous Montreal counterparts, as did the Rouyn-Noranda and Eastern Township residents. At the same time, the residents of cities in the Saguenay-Lac Saint Jean area considered themselves to be satellites of Quebec City, and inferior to its residents in economic and social status. Once again, then, it was the factor of "transition", of being mid-way between an "old" and a "new pattern of life, of desiring to elevate oneself to the level of those in the large urban centers, which was dominant in the calculations of Social Credit voters.

In summarizing his findings, Irvine concludes that "Social Credit was a product of nationalist and economic frustrations which were probably prompted less by objective conditions than by the individual's own subjective estimation of his status".<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Meisel, op. cit. p.134





In other words, even in the case of the Social Credit voter in Quebec the affinity for Social Credit is best explained in terms of a subjective condition, an attitude of mind. This attitudinal syndrome, which combines the traditional and modern, the old and the new, derives, in this writer's opinion, primarily from historical and partisan influences and from changing social and economic conditions which relate directly to status-perception and political beliefs. Current and rapidly changing political alignments and party strategies affect and influence these attitudes only secondarily.

If this holds as true for the Social Credit voter, it is even more significant for the Social Credit party leader. It is the attitudes and beliefs of these individuals which are the most important indicators of their political behaviors. Information about their socio-economic background is also important, but only insofar as it illuminates the attitudes of these men. It is the attitudes and beliefs of these members of the party élite, then, which provides the key to the problem of party splits and party integration in Canada. And in the case of Social Credit, at least, it is the conflict revolving around and arising from markedly different clusterings of attitudes of Quebecers about class, status, economic position, political participation, and fundamental beliefs -- in short, the entire spectrum



of beliefs and orientations and which characterize the political sub-culture of Quebec -- which explains that party's failure to achieve integration and a working partnership between their French-and English-language groups.

The pattern of Social Credit history and Social Credit French-English relations is by no means atypical. In important respects that party is merely a microcosm of the larger Canadian society. This study was intended to point up the truth in what to most social scientists is almost a truism: that what is achieved politically by our national political parties is likely to define the limits of what is achievable by the entire political system, and what proves impossible in political parties is likely to fail in the larger system as well. The parties are the most important vehicles for political participation available to our politically active citizens. They are also the major engines operating the democratic political machine and ensuring its continued functioning.

The conflict between the "old" and "new" styles in Quebec politics, between those of higher and lower education, status, and income, between those believing in the "traditional" French-Canadian way of life and those opting for a newer, more "modern", and more dynamic folk-way, between those accepting the present inferior status of





French Canadians vis-à-vis English-speaking Canadians, and those challenging it in both words and deeds -- all of these forces are common to the Social Credit Party and to Canada as a whole. The experience of disunity and disintegration in the Social Credit Party may appear to bode ill for the larger Canadian experiment in biculturalism.

On the other hand, both Quebec and Canada as a whole are in a state of rapid social, economic and political transformation. It may be that Social Credit represents in this respect, as in so many other respects, a phenomenon of the past. Today our attention is turning away from the "traditional" and "transitional" French-Canadian political man and towards the fully "modern" participant. The question which is so central to the future of the Canadian experiment is: can the "modern" political man be fully integrated into the "modern" and changing Canadian society and policy?

Our initial foray into this complex field has pointed to a pessimistic conclusion. It appears that the "transitional-to-modern" French-Canadian political partisan is better able to integrate with his English-speaking counterparts than either the "traditional-to-transitional" or the fully "modern" partisan. In his new concern for the political, economic, social and cultural "épanouissement" of French Canadians, the fully "modern" French-Canadian political man has been finding himself in increasing conflict with English-speaking Canadians. The most outspoken nationalists



in the two major political parties appear to be those French-Canadians whom we might consider to be the most "modern" in their political beliefs and orientations: the Sauvés, the Levesques, the Laportes, The Bertrands, the Marchands. In the N.D.P. party, it was the youngest and most highly educated French-Canadians who were most at odds with the English-speaking "old guard" at the time of that party's founding convention in 1960.

There are, however, certain bases for optimism as well. In the two major parties there appear to be signs of a growing recognition of the changes taking place in French Canada and a desire to meet the demands arising from this change. This is true both of the Pearson Liberals who have fashioned the concept of "cooperative federalism" together with the various measures designed to give concrete substance to it and the group of younger Progressive Conservative partisans who are expected to assume the leadership of the party after Mr. Diefenbaker retires. In the N.D.P. Party the leaders appear ready to accommodate a new group of young French-Canadians who are willing to de-emphasize ideological issues in the hope of obtaining a real voice in the party's decision-making and financial organs.

The really unanswered question, however, is whether even such substantial changes, implemented both in party echelons and in the political system itself, will be





sufficient to satisfy the "modern" French-Canadian political élite which will be assuming more and more political control in Quebec in the future. It is a question which probably cannot be answered on the basis of any empirical evidence. The ideal of an integrated, bicultural, and fully "modern" Canada capable of taking its place among the important multicultural communities of the world, appears to this author to be a most exciting and desirable one for police-makers and citizens alike. At the very least, it is surely worth our while to attempt to achieve it.

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